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Abstract 
The occurrence of internal armed conflict in Africa has increased over the last 
two decades.   As such, Africa continues to be viewed by many as a troubled 
continent.  In an attempt to avoid further conflict in Africa, organisations such 
as the United Nations have implemented comprehensive tools and strategies 
to prevent further conflicts from occurring.  However, the genocide in Rwanda 
and the on-going unrest in Sudan have shown that there is still a lot of work 
to be done.  In both these cases, the conflicts took place or escalated even 
with UN presence on ground. This paper will thus examine the UN's legal role 
in the prevention of internal armed conflict and establish the type of lessons 
that could be learnt from Rwanda and Sudan. 
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CHAPTER I  INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1.1 The UN and Africa 
Article 1.1 of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions1 defines internal armed 
conflicts as conflicts that cannot be characterised as either international armed 
conflicts or wars of liberation.2  The end of the cold war saw an increase of 
such conflicts, particularly in Africa.  Somalia, Liberia, Mozambique, Angola, 
The Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Sudan and Rwanda have 
been affected by such conflicts.  
Since its inception in 1945, the primary goal of the UN has been to maintain 
international peace and security as envisioned in Chapter I Article 1.1 of the 
Charter. To ensure that the goal is achieved in a “prompt and effective man-
ner”, Article 24 of the Charter confers this primary responsibility on the Security 
Council.3 
As part of fulfilling its cardinal mission, the UN has deployed sixty-five peace-
keeping operations worldwide since 1948 and dispatched teams to investigate 
and offer suggestions on the way forward for states facing peace and security 
challenges. Today, fifteen operations are active worldwide, with Africa alone 
having a total of seven active peacekeeping operations.4  As a result of these 
                                                   
1 The Geneva Conventions are made up of four treaties and three additional protocols. These establish 
the standards of international law and the accepted norm for the treatment of the victims of war. In 
general, the term Geneva Convention encompasses the agreements of 1949, signed after World War II 
(1939–45), which revised the terms of the first three treaties (1864, 1906, 1929), and added a fourth 
treaty.  Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-
conventions/index.jsp (Date of Use: 20 April 2012).   
2
 Protocol II further provides that internal armed conflict, must take place in the territory of a High 
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organised armed 
groups, which under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to ena-
ble them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement (Protocol II). 
3 Article 24 further provides that the specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge 
of its duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. 
4
See United Nations “Peacekeeping Factsheet” 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml (Date of use: 25 May 2011) 
See also United Nations “UN at a Glance” http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (Date of use:  
25 May 2011).           
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peacekeeping efforts, the UN has assisted in ending conflicts by overseeing 
the negotiation of one hundred and seventy peace agreements since 1945.  
In spite of its peacekeeping efforts, the following are two examples of internal 
armed conflicts that escalated even with UN presence on ground: 
1.1.1 The case of Rwanda in brief 
In 1994, an estimated 800 000 people were killed within 100 days, after an es-
calation of a four year conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda.5 
It took place at a time when the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda 
(UNAMIR)6 was present. The Security Council had been informed that Rwan-
da was on the verge of a catastrophe and yet it ordered a bulk of the UN 
peacekeepers out of Rwanda.7 This decision emanated from the fact that none 
of the five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council showed any will-
ingness to handle the crisis in a more assertive manner.8 Consequently, the 
case of Rwanda has been considered as a UN failure. Cousens explains the 
failure as follows: 
The council‟s failure in 1994 was not precisely to prevent conflict – which had 
been underway, if on the modest scale, for four years but to prevent it expo-
nential escalation into genocide, especially in a context where there was 
already a UN mission (UNAMIR) on the ground.9 
 
Furthermore, in 1999, Kofi Annan10 set up an independent inquiry to investi-
gate the actions of the UN at the time of the genocide in Rwanda. The findings 
of the Carlsson report11 indicated that the genocide in Rwanda could have 
                                                   
5 See Harsch “The world reflects on Rwanda genocide” Available at 
http://www.un.org/en/africarenewal/newrels/rwanda.htm (Date of Use: 19 April 2012). 
6 See S/Res 872. 
7 See Vogt United Nations and Security in Africa 308.  See also: S/Res 912 of 1994 which reduced UN-
AMIR’s strength from 2,548 to 270. 
8 See Fenton Understanding the UN Security Council 132. 
9 See Cousens Conflict Prevention 104. 
10 Kofi Annan served as Director of UN Peacekeeping operations at the time of the Rwandan genocide 
and later as the seventh Secretary-General of the UN from 1997 to 2006. 
11
See United Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry Into the Actions of the United Nations during 
the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, December 15 1999, Ingvar Carlsson, Han Sung-Joo, Rufus Kupolati. UN 
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been prevented and /or subsequently stopped had the UN taken appropriate 
action.12 Essentially, the report outlines the following as failures of the UN: 
a)  Member states lacked the political will to act or acted with no asser-
tiveness. This in turn affected the ability to obtain sufficient troops for 
the UNAMIR13 
b) Available resources were not utilised constructively14 
1.1.2 The case of Sudan in brief 
The civil conflict between the north and south of Sudan led to the death of over 
two million people and an estimated four million displaced civilians. The north-
south conflict was mainly caused by issues over land ownership, the role of 
religion and the sharing of power and the country‟s oil revenues.15 The twenty-
two year civil war came to an end in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehen-
sive Peace Agreement (CPA) by the Sudan People‟s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLMA) and the government of Sudan. 
UN Resolution 159016 established the deployment of a United Nations Mission 
in Sudan (UNMIS) to facilitate the signing of the CPA. In spite of this agree-
ment, tensions in Darfur, a region in the western of Sudan continued to 
intensify.  Violent clashes between the government‟s allied Arab militia (the 
Janjaweed) and the SLPMA and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
escalated to new heights.  
The African Union (AU) had long been engaged in facilitating peace and secu-
rity in Sudan, particularly in Darfur.  The signing of the Darfur Peace 
                                                                                                                                                  
Doc S/1999/1257 (hereinafter referred to as the “Carlsson Report”). Available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/47/IMG/N9939547.pdf?OpenElement  (Date of Use: 29 April 
2011). 
12 Ibid., 3.  
13




 See Sriram, Martin-Ortega and Herman War, Conflict and Human Rights 126. See also Global Policy 
Forum, “Sudan/Darfur”http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-
security-council-agenda/sudan.html and Insight on Conflict, “Sudan (North &South)” 
http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/sudan/ (Date of use: 20 April 2011). 
16
 See S/Res 1590. 
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Agreement (DPA) in May 2006 was one of the results of such efforts.  Howev-
er, this agreement did not stop the violence in Darfur. Therefore, the Security 
Council expanded the mandate of UNMIS to also include Darfur.  This man-
date would primarily support the implementation of the DPA and the 
deployment of a peacekeeping force in Darfur with the consent of the Suda-
nese government.  The government of Sudan strongly opposed the 
deployment of a peacekeeping force in Darfur.17  They insisted that they would 
only accept the same provided that the peacekeeping force had an “African 
character”.  Accordingly, resolution 1769 saw the establishment of a hybrid 
mission known as the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
(UNAMID) whose mandate is to protect civilians and help humanitarians help 
those in need.18 
However, at the Fifteenth session of the Human Rights Council19 the Secre-
tary-General received a written statement, “The UN in Darfur – and the 
silencing of Information” in which the continued violence in Darfur was high-
lighted.  The report stated that at least sixty-five civilians had been killed and 
more than eighty-six wounded in attacks in the North and West of Darfur on 2 
and 3 September 2010.20  A month prior to this, it is believed that “inter-
factional killings” also took place in South Darfur.  The statement criticized 
UNAMID for not fully protecting the civilian population of Darfur, which is the 
very core of its mandate. The statement further criticized UN officials for “al-
lowing those responsible for the vast human catastrophe in Darfur to decide 
what the UN says to the world about the present nature of the catastrophe”.21 
The statement called upon the Human Rights Council to act decisively by 
adopting a firmer resolution that would help end the violence. 
It is believed that the violence has carried on due to the government‟s failure to 
commit to the CPA and the CPA‟s failure to recognize any other rebel groups 
apart from the SLPMA and also its failure to tackle the root causes of the con-
                                                   
17
 See Hoge 2006-09-20 The New York Times. 
18 See S/Res 1769. 
19 See A/HRC/15/NGO/76. 
20
 Ibid.,  paras 3 and 4. 
21 Ibid., para 8. 
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flict. Moreover, the mandate itself does not seem to outline any action to be 
taken against the Sudanese government in the event of non-compliance.22 
The challenges that UNAMID faces seem to be predominantly a matter of lack 
of resources and also what appears to be the ineffective drafting of the man-
date. The Sudanese government has been known to hinder progress by 
deliberately delaying or denying visas to certain UN staff because their nation-
alities did not meet the "African character" clause.23 
Consequently, as at July 2011, UNAMID only had 17 759 troops available as 
opposed to the 19 555 troops envisioned in its mandate of 2007.24    
In addition, the political will of member states of the UN has also been brought 
to question in the crisis in Sudan as was the case in Rwanda. In the case of 
Sudan, Russia and China have been known to curtail strong action or use of 
force against the Sudanese government due to their own national interests.25 
This contributed to the continued bloodshed and defiance of the CPA.  
Today, despite the independence of South Sudan and the presence of UN-
AMISS (United Mission in the Republic of South Sudan)26, UNISFA (United 
Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei)27 and UNAMID, the country contin-
ues to be plagued by numerous violent conflicts. 
1.2 The UN and conflict prevention 
In efforts to keep the world peaceful, the UN has in recent times moved from a 
culture of “reaction” to one of “prevention”.  In doing so, the UN aims to ad-
dress the underlying root causes of conflict before conflict manifests in any 
                                                   
22 See Kreps “UNAMID” 2007 (16) ASR 67. 
23 See Weschler UN Response to the Darfur  9. 
24
 See S/Res 1769.  See also United Nations, “Peacekeeping Factsheet”. 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml 
25 See Weschler UN Response to the Darfur 7. 
26 UNAMIS mandate ended on 9 July 2011. UNAMISS was established under S/Res 1996 on 8 July 2011 
to consolidate peace and security in South Sudan and to help establish conditions for development. 
27
 S/Res 1990 established UNISFA on 27 June 2011 to demilitarise and monitor the disputed area of 
Abyei. 
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form.  Generally, four forms of conflict prevention are recognised by the UN 
and the four categories could be summarised as follows 28: 
1) Any action taken by the UN to curb armed conflict before it occurs in 
any “serious way”. 
2) Action taken by the UN to prevent the escalation of conflict may take 
one of two forms: 
a. Any action taken by the UN at the first sign of conflict 
b. Any action taken by the UN in a conflict area where they already 
have presence 
3) Any action taken by the UN to prevent crisis of a humanitarian nature 
4) Any action taken by the UN to prevent the repetition of conflict particu-
larly after peace agreements have been signed  
As seen above, the UN's role in conflict prevention poses an extensive area of 
study.  In an attempt to limit the same, this study focuses only on three consid-
erations: 
i. Internal armed conflict: armed violence between governmental authori-
ties and organised armed groups. This study will not examine the other 
forms of conflict recognised by International law. 
ii. In examining the UN's role in preventing conflict, this study will primarily 
focus on the Security Council, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) 
and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPO). 
iii. The prevention of armed conflict only as illustrated in categories 2(b) 
and 4 above.  These categories will be examined because mass killings 
took place in Rwanda even with UN presence on ground. Also, the UN 
has apparently continued to face major security challenges in spite of 
numerous peace agreements being signed as is the case in Sudan. 
The UN has strong tools to prevent the escalation of armed conflict (category 
2(b)). With the use of Chapter VI of the Charter, the Security Council is able to 
call upon parties to a dispute to settle their dispute by means of negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to re-
                                                   
28
 See Cousens Conflict Prevention 106. 
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gional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.  
Under Chapter VII, the Security Council may call for the severance of diplo-
matic ties, impose sanctions or enforcement actions against governments who 
threaten or breach the peace. For example, the UN was able to impose an 
arm embargo on Sudan; a travel ban, and an assets freeze on individuals des-
ignated in the committee list.29    
With regards to the UN's role in preventing armed conflicts from recurring (cat-
egory 4), the UN has greatly expanded its capabilities in this area. UN 
missions are now able to provide assistance towards the transition of govern-
ment after conflict in the form of electoral assistance, validation of peace 
accords, ensuring that human rights are respected,  police training, arm dis-
armament, land demining etc.30 In spite of these effective tools, internal wars 
reoccur and/or societies remain fragile (as is the case in Sudan).  
As a whole, it would appear that the limitations the UN faces in conflict preven-
tion are more to do with the speed at which it responds to conflict and the 
various political hurdles it has and not necessarily its intention and/or execu-
tion of its duties. In most cases, the Security Council has shown the will to act 
but the knowledge that armed conflict exists has not necessarily led the mem-
ber states to want to act.31 Also, the veto power appears to present challenges 
of its own.  For instance, two of the P5 (Russia and China) have been known 
to use this power to block tougher action against the Sudanese government.   
Moreover, the African continent tends to show reluctance in times of conflict to 
fully involve the United Nations as they feel that African problems should be 
handled by Africans.  Guehenno makes clear that the success of Peacekeep-
                                                                                                                                                  
 
29 See S/Res 1590. See also United Nations, ‘Security Council Committee established pursuant to reso-
lution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan”  http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1591/ (Date of use:6 
September 2011). 
30 See Shaw International Law 1234. 
31 See Wemester Conflict Prevention at the UN 380.  See also United Nations, “Peacemaking and Con-
flict Prevention” http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/peacemaking (Date of use: 
6 September 2011). 
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ing Operations heavily depends on ten factors, much of which relies on greater 
member state co-operation.32 
In view thereof, one could ask: Are the limitations of the UN merely limitations 
caused by member states (particularly the P5) themselves? How can the UN 
ensure greater member state co-operation and involvement? 
Since the actions of peacekeeping missions such as UNAMID, UNAMISS and   
UNISFA play and will continue to play a significant role in conflict prevention, 
this study will make a great contribution to gaining a better understanding of 
the UN‟s role in conflict. 
                                                   
32
 Guehenno emphasises the importance of member state cooperation by stating that members of the 
UN Security Council, particularly the P5, have to agree on the desired outcome of the operation, and 
ensure it is a clear mandate.  Also, Guehenno points out the importance of drafting an achievable 
mandate. In this regard, the Council should only authorise missions where it is confident that member 
states will provide sufficiently trained and equipped troops.  In addition, the international community 
has to be prepared to stay the course and commit to the peacekeeping operation for the long run.  See 
Guehenno “UNPK” 2002 CT (3) 10.  
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2 CHAPTER II THE ‘LAWS’ OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT AND EVOLU-
TION OF CONFLICT PREVENTION 
2.1 Parties to an internal armed conflict 
As seen above (chapter1, 1.2), internal armed conflict involves armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organised armed groups. These organ-
ised armed groups or „rebels‟ are often believed to seek control over territory in 
a sovereign state.  Natural resources in the disputed territories have often 
proved to be the reason why the rebels engage in combat to wield control over 
the said territories. These rebels in legal literature are frequently referred to as 
insurgents and are considered international legal subjects.33  However, not 
every rebel group or organised armed group is regarded as an international 
subject. In order to be considered as an international law subject, Cassese 
succinctly summarises the requirements as follows: 
a) The rebel group should prove that they have effective control over part 
of the territory.34 
b) Civil commotion should reach a certain degree of intensity. 35 
It is important to note that the actual recognition of such groups as insurgents 
is determined by the state involved in the civil war and any other state involved 
in it.36  The states have the power to grant such recognition if the above re-
quirements have been met or refuse to grant such recognition if it is of the 
opinion that the aforementioned requirements have not been fully met.  In the 
event recognition of insurgency is granted, in essence, rebels are "entitled to 
all the rights, and subject to all the obligations, deriving from jus in bello".37 
However, it is worthy to note that if the international community as a whole did 
not feel such recognition was warranted, then the rebel group would not be 
able to "exercise any of the rights and fulfil the obligations inherent in its inter-
                                                   
33
 See Cassese International Law 125. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. Civil commotions consisting of riots or sporadic short lived acts of violence are not considered 
to fall under this category. 
36
 See Cassese International Law 125. 
37 Ibid., 126. 
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national status, however strong, effective, and protracted its authority over a 
portion of the territory belonging to a sovereign state".38   
Experience has shown that even though the parties to an internal armed con-
flict include the “lawful‟ government on the one hand and a person or group 
rebelling against the „lawful” government on the other, third states are often 
involved.  Third states tend to support either side by providing military assis-
tance depending on their own political or ideological leaning.39 For example, 
the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which began in 1996 
exhibited such characteristics. Countries such as Uganda and Rwanda inter-
vened in the war directly and also provided assistance to the domestic 
Congolese rebel forces.40 Rwanda justified its involvement in the conflict by 
claiming that their action was required to get rid of Hutu extremists in the DRC. 
Uganda by the same token claimed that their involvement was to fight Hutu 
extremists.41 In addition, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad and Su-
dan have all taken part in the Congolese conflict in one form or another.42 
Experience has also shown that at times conflicts may show characters of an 
internal character at the outset and later change to an international charac-
ter.43 
2.2 Laws governing internal armed conflict 
By way of background, it must be noted that International humanitarian law 
(IHL) governs the rights and obligations of the parties to a conflict in the con-
duct of hostilities.  These rights and obligations were conceived to limit the 
effects of armed conflict. 
Prior to the cold war, not much importance was attached to internal armed 
conflicts.44 Accordingly, the international community invested a huge amount of 
                                                   
38 See Cassese International Law 127. 
39 Ibid., 429. 
40 Sriram, Martin-Ortega, Herman War, Conflict and Human Rights 103. 
41 Ibid. 
42
 Sriram, Martin-Ortega, Herman War, Conflict and Human Rights 103. 
43 A good example of a conflict which demonstrates such behavior is the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia in the early nineties. The conflict initially began as an internal war but after Croatia and 
Bosnia Herzegovina gained independence, the conflict later became an international one. 
44
 See Smith “Trends and Causes  of Armed Conflict” 5. Available at http://www.berghof-
handbook.net/all/ (Date of Use: 22 May 2012). 
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time, effort and resources to prevent future conflict between states and protec-
tion of civilians caught in such hostilities. Organisations such as the United 
Nations spearheaded the signing of treaties, conventions and protocols to limit 
the effects of wars between states.  These treaties, conventions and protocols 
were, however, predominantly formulated for conflicts between states in 
mind.45  The main reason for this was that the international community did not 
foresee that internal armed conflicts would later pose a greater threat to inter-
national peace and security.   
After the cold war, it was evident that conflicts between small groups or tribes 
were now capable of causing human suffering of great magnitude while also 
spilling over to neighbouring countries.46  It also became clear that Internation-
al humanitarian law appeared to be inadequate in its application since its 
provisions were created with interstate wars in mind.47 However, this is not to 
say that no laws governed or regulated internal armed conflicts prior to the 
cold war.  Apart from principles of international law derived from custom, Article 
3 common to the four Geneva conventions and protocol II of 1977 (to a limited 
extent) could be applied.48 
Article 3 is applicable to any armed conflict and thus establishes humanitarian 
protection also for victims of hostilities in internal armed conflict. Protocol II of 
1977 is applicable only if the armed conflict is of high intensity, duration and 
magnitude. Therefore, internal armed conflicts meeting this criterion could find 
application in this provision. 
                                                   
45  For example the 1948 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the French Republic for the settlement of intercustodial 
conflicts relating to German enemy assets; 1950 Agreement between the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Federal Government of the Swiss 
Confederation for the settlement of conflicting claims to German assets in their respective 
territories;1954 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and Norway 
on conflicting claims to enemy property;1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict;1965 Convention on the conflicts of laws relating to the form of testamentary 
dispositions ;1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) 
46 See Bosker, De Ree “The Spread of Civil War” Available at 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7532 (Date of Use: 22 May 2012). 
47 See Schindler and Toman The Laws of Armed Conflicts ix. 
48
 See Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions which sets out the rules and obligations of 
parties to a conflict not of an international character.  See also Protocol II of 1977. 
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As the international community grew more concerned with addressing internal 
armed conflict, the Security Council saw fit to respond by using measures un-
der Chapter VII of the Charter.49  It also became evident that these types of 
conflicts were more widespread and motivated by ethnic, religious and racial 
reasons.  Internal armed conflicts could no longer be seen as national prob-
lems but rather as conflicts that had the capability to violate human rights and 
humanitarian law at such a large scale that they also affected the interests of 
the international community as a whole.50  
In a further attempt to address these growing concerns, the Security Council 
established tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal of former Yu-
goslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and most recently, The Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon (STL) to try persons who are allegedly responsible for heinous 
crimes committed against humanity.51   
It is through the work of the aforementioned tribunals that additional headway 
has been made in humanitarian law.  For instance, the decision in the Tadic 
case (Interlocutory appeal) ICTY set forth the view that the distinction between 
inter-state wars and internal armed conflicts was no longer significant.52 It fol-
lowed that International rules could now be applied to internal armed conflicts.  
The revolutionary reasoning behind this decision was to further promote the 
respect for human dignity and punish those who violated such dignity and ef-
fectively address the new nature of internal armed conflict.53 
                                                   
49 The first time the Security council used Chapter VII for an internal armed conflict was in 1992. See 
S/Res 794 (Somalia) S/Res 929 (Rwanda); S/Res 770 (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and S/Res 1244 
(Kosovo). 
50 The Security Council in establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the 
International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) determined in their resolutions that ‘widespread 
violations of international humanitarian law constitute a threat to international peace and security.’  
See S/Res 808, 827 and 955. See also Schindler, Toman The Laws of Armed Conflicts ix. 
51See ICTR “About ICTR” 
http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx ICTY, “About ICTY” 
http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY, SCSL “About SCSL” http://www.sc-sl.org/ and see also STL 
“About STL” http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl (Date of Use: 12 March 2012). 
52
 See The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999 (herein-
after referred to as the Tadic case). 
53 The Tadic case provided the following rationale with regard to extending the rules governing inter-
national armed conflict to civil strife “Indeed, elementary considerations of humanity and common 
sense make it preposterous that the use by States of weapons prohibited in armed conflicts between 
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It follows amongst other things that with the „blurring‟ of the distinction between 
interstate conflicts and internal armed conflict, victims of hostilities are protect-
ed to a wider extent.54  Furthermore, individuals who are believed to have 
committed crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide during or after 
an internal armed conflict can now be held accountable by rules governing in-
ternational criminal justice.   
2.3 Causes of Conflicts in Africa 
Africa has experienced the greatest number of internal armed conflict in the 
world (Refer to Annexure A).55 Essentially, conflicts in other parts of the world 
still occur but what makes Africa‟s conflicts more brutal and widespread? What 
makes this continent susceptible to more human rights violations than other 
continents? Why do conflicts that seem to have been stopped, reoccur at later 
stages? Why do Africans in conflict tend to favour organisations such as the 
African Union (AU) instead of the UN to handle their problems? How can the 
UN address conflicts in Africa in a more effective manner? These are some of 
the questions and discussions that underpin the deciphering of conflicts in Afri-
ca. 
Understanding the conflicts in Africa is complex.  Complex, because it not only 
requires the understanding of the current conflict at hand but also an under-
standing of the colonial history of Africa, as well as the understanding of 
relations between the different tribal groups.  Each African country consists of 
ethnic groups, each varying in culture from tribe to tribe. For example, at least 
fifty ethnic groups and six hundred tribes have been identified in Sudan.56  
                                                                                                                                                  
themselves be allowed when States try to put down rebellion by their own nationals on their territory.  
What is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot be inhumane and in-
admissible in civil strife” (para 119 of the Tadic case).  
54 See Schindler and Toman The Laws of Armed Conflicts ix. 
55
 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) has recorded ongoing violent conflicts since the 1970s. 
The data provided is one of the most accurate and well-used data-sources on global armed conflicts 
and its definition of armed conflict is becoming a standard in how conflicts are systematically defined 
and studied. See also Uppsala Universitet, Department of peace and conflict Research, “Charts and 
Graphs” http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/ (Date of Use: 22 March 2012). 
56
 See UNIC Khartoum, “Sudanese tribes” http://unic.un.org/imucms/khartoum/36/499/sudanese-
tribes.aspx  (Date of Use: 22 March 2012). 
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Generally, the history of Africa could be, in the context of its conflicts, divided 
into two eras. The first era, being the era in which violence was necessary to 
gain freedom from colonial powers and the second era, the period after the 
cold war. 
2.3.1 Conflicts in Africa: First Era  
During the 50‟s and 60‟s, widespread violence occurred in Africa, all in the 
name of overthrowing colonial powers and gaining independence.  Countries 
like Kenya, Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia gained independence through 
their liberation movements in the 60‟s and were later joined by Namibia, Zim-
babwe, and South Africa in the struggle for freedom. 
These wars, which are referred to as wars of liberation, were legitimised by the 
need to overthrow the colonialists. Therefore, the political objectives of libera-
tion movements such as SWAPO in Namibia, ZANU in Zimbabwe and Frelimo 
in Mozambique and the means they used to achieve their objectives were rec-
ognised as lawful.57 
2.3.2 Conflicts in Africa: Second Era 
After the liberation of most African countries, the cold war took place and this 
in turn brought in a new wave of conflicts. These conflicts, often between super 
powers also drew in African countries like Angola and Mozambique.   
In the years following the cold war, another wave of conflicts hit Africa.  Even 
though these conflicts were between parties within a state, they exhibited 
greater brutality and magnitude. These wars exhibited characteristics such as 
abductions of children, massacres and mutilations, large scale looting and de-
struction of property.58 Moreover, women and children appeared to be the 
greatest victims. Children were now forced to pick up arms and fight as sol-
diers as was the case in Uganda and Sierra Leone.59 Women were often 
                                                   
57 See Young, Africa Beginners Guide 88. 
58  Ibid., 90. 
59 For example, in Uganda, an armed rebellion known as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been 
known to recruit children as soldiers who make up almost 90% of the LRA’s soldiers.  These children 
have been “brutalised and forced to commit atrocities on fellow abductees and even siblings.” See 
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victims of mass rape and killings.  It is believed that the main reason for this 
brutality is that the parties engaged in internal armed conflict very often have 
no knowledge or regard towards the treatment of civilians in hostilities as pro-
vided in International Humanitarian law.60 
The causes for this sudden surge in internal conflicts could be attributed to the 
following factors: 
a) Differences in morals and religion.61  For example, between the period 
1999 and 2003, the northern states of Nigeria experienced widespread 
conflict between the Christians and Muslims.62 
b) Political issues.63 Often, these political issues were based on Africans 
who saw the need to liberate themselves from their leaders by organis-
ing themselves into rebel groups and building their armies.  Some 
examples of such rebel leaders included Rwanda‟s Paul Kigame, 
Uganda‟s Yoweri Museveni and Eritrea‟s Isaias Afewerki. 
c) Matters pertaining to the different ethnicities.64 Differences in ethnicities 
have often been thought to be the underlying root cause of many civil 
wars in Africa.  A divergence of interests between the ethnic groups has 
sometimes led to conflict.  For example, the civil war in Rwanda.  It is 
believed that the occurrence of this war stemmed from the grievances 
between the Tutsi‟s and Hutus (see 1.1.1 above). 
d) Disputes in the distribution of land and natural resources.65 An example 
of a conflict that was brought about because of this factor is the civil war 
in Sudan. Even though the causes of the civil war in Sudan could be 
considered as complex, it is believed that the source of conflict lies in 
                                                                                                                                                  
United Nations “Uganda: Child Soldiers at Centre of Mounting Humanitarian Crisis” 
http://www.un.org/events/tenstories/06/story.asp?storyID=100 (Date of Use: 29 January 2013). 
60 See Schindler, Toman The Laws of Armed Conflict viii. 
61 See Sriram, Martin-Ortega, Herman War, Conflict and Human Rights 13. 
62 See Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre “Displacement related to religious conflicts occurs 
mainly in the north, 1999-2003.  Available at http://www.internal-
displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/529F74E9C1C0DC60802570B8005AAA
26?OpenDocument (Date of Use: 20 May 2012).  See also Human Rights Watch “Nigeria: Inter-
communal violence and arbitrary killings” http://www.hrw.org/en/features/nigeria-arbitrary-killings-
security-forces (Date of Use: 24 May 2012). 
63
 See Sriram, Martin-Ortega, Herman War, Conflict and Human Rights 13. 
64 Ibid., 14. 
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the failure of the north and south of Sudan to reach an agreement on 
matters related to land distribution and natural resources (see 1.1.2 
above). 
e) Inequality and the violation of human rights.66 These factors normally 
manifest in the social, economic and political structures or actions of a 
state.  Inequalities in the aforementioned structures have often led to 
the emergence of violence as was the case in the north-south conflict in 
Sudan and Rwanda.67 
Although the above factors have at one point or another, alluded to being the 
cause of conflicts in Africa, this does not necessarily mean that their existence 
will always result in a conflict.  In most cases, even though the above factors 
had always existed, the mobilisation of conflict usually occurred when the per-
ception of current conditions in a state was manipulated by its political leaders 
and the different social groups felt insecure.68 For example the Tutsi‟s and Hu-
tus in Rwanda had co-existed for many centuries. The fragile relation between 
the two is believed to date back to the days of Belgian colonialism. During 
Belgian‟s colonial rule, the Belgians are believed to have created a rift be-
tween the two tribes by favouring the Tutsi‟s over the Hutus. After the Belgians 
withdrew from Rwanda, the seed of inequality had taken root.  In spite of this, 
the two groups did not automatically go to war. It was only when the politicians 
had succeeded in manipulating their perceptions of inequality that they went to 
war.69  
In some cases, pursuit of power and wealth by leaders and would-be leaders 
has led to conflict.  The 2007-2008 electoral crisis in Kenya exemplifies the 
use of widespread violence to achieve individual political goals.70   
                                                                                                                                                  
65 See Sriram, Martin-Ortega, Herman War, Conflict and Human Rights 14. 
66 Ibid. 
67 See DFID Briefing paper D “Working effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile situations” March 
2010 4. 
68 See Sriram, Martin-Ortega, Herman War, Conflict and Human Rights 15. 
69 Ibid. 
70 See Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/23/kenya-icc-judges-ok-election-
violence-trials and also http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/kenyan-minister-resigns-
after-charges-over-election-violence-6295359.html (Date of Use: 19 April 2012). 
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2.4 Evolution of conflict prevention 
Key armed conflicts of the nineties made it exceedingly imperative for the in-
ternational community to establish the appropriate tools and measures to be 
applied in order to contain tensions from escalating to violent conflicts.  Ac-
cordingly, the UN shifted from a culture of “reaction” to one of “prevention” (see 
1.2 above). 
As foreshadowed above, the mandate of the UN has always been to maintain 
international peace and security. As was also highlighted above (1.2), the vari-
ous coercive and non-coercive measures that may be taken to prevent 
conflicts are evidenced in the UN Charter (Chapters VI and VII).  It can thus be 
substantially inferred that only the nature of conflict prevention has changed.   
To further its goals, the UN has divided its areas of activity into four categories: 
1) Peacekeeping 2) Peacebuilding 3) Conflict Prevention and mediation and 4) 
Peace enforcement.71  
Several important organs of the UN have been tasked with the role of under-
taking these activities.72 As stated in 1.2 above, this paper will predominantly 
examine the UN‟s peacemaking efforts as carried out by the DPO, DPA and 
the Security Council. 
2.4.1 The role of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) 
Peacemaking activities and Conflict Prevention and mediation activities are 
mainly carried out by the DPA.73 Before commenting on how the department 
carries out these efforts, it is worthwhile to define the said activities. 
                                                   
71 See United Nations Peacekeeping “Peace and Security”     
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml (Date of Use: 19 March 2012) and see 
also Luck, United Nations Security Council 33. 
72 The UN bodies and agencies involved in conflict prevention are: Security Council; General Assembly; 
Sec-Gen and his special representatives and Envoys; Department of Political Affairs; Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations; United Nations Development Programme; World Food Programme; World 
Health Organisation; United Nations Children’s Fund; Department for Disarmament Affairs; United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; Office for the Co-ordination Affairs; United Nations 
Development Fund for Women; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation; Food 
and Agricultural Organisation; Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 
73
 See United Nations, DPA “Role of the DPA” 
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/about/overview (Date of Use: 16 March 2012). 
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Conflict Prevention and mediation: Includes any diplomatic measures taken to 
prevent the escalation of internal tensions to violent conflicts by primarily moni-
toring and assessing global political developments, warning of crises before 
they break out and providing direct support for preventative diplomacy.74   
Peacemaking:  Involves any form of diplomatic activities that are undertaken to 
bring parties to a conflict to a negotiated agreement.75 
It is apparent from the said activities that the DPA could be regarded as a 
“watchdog” for conflicts. Through its work, the department provides support to 
the numerous envoys of the Secretary-General in the prevention and man-
agement of crises.76 In addition, the department provides mediation support to 
UN political missions in areas of tension.77 The DPA assists by providing quali-
fied staff and ensuring that on-going talks have the required resources.78 
The DPA has been able to carry out its tasks with the help of regional organi-
sations and member states.79 The DPA has also been able to bolster its efforts 
with the use of conflict prevention Early Warning Systems (EWS)80 and the 
advanced use of today‟s communication technology.  
Even though there remains much room for development, the DPA and DPKO‟s 
reliance on EWS and advanced communication technologies, has enabled 
them to acquire the means to foresee and react to crisis more rapidly.81  They 
are able to acquire a substantial amount of information and jointly analyse the 
early signals. 
                                                   
74 See United Nations Peacekeeping “Peace and Security” 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml (Date of Use: 19 March 2012). 
75 Ibid. 
76 See United Nations, DPA “Role of the DPA” 
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/about/overview (Date of Use: 16 March 2012). 
77  See United Nations, DPA “Role of the DPA” 




80 Activities undertaken under the umbrella of Early Warning Systems (EWS) may include fact-finding 
missions, consultations, inspections, report mechanisms, and monitoring. See Miller Glossary of Terms 
and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies 24. 
81
 See Dorn “Tools of the Trade? Monitoring and surveillance Technologies in the UN peacekeeping” 
2007 7. 
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The work of the DPA has in recent times also extended to peacebuilding ef-
forts. Peacebuilding82 involves any activities undertaken in the aftermath of 
internal armed conflict to prevent conflicts from re-occurring.83  Examples of 
such activities include electoral assistance, validation of peace accords, ensur-
ing that human rights are respected, police training, arm disarmament, land 
demining, investigation of past and existing abuses etc. The importance of 
peacebuilding activities are emphasised by the Carnegie Commission in which 
it was stated that the prevention of future conflict can be achieved “through the 
creation of a safe and secure environment in the aftermath of a conflict and the 
achievement of a peace settlement”.84 
The DPA also provides substantive and secretariat support to the UN Security 
Council.85 For instance, the DPA is in a broader sense is involved in the UN‟s 
effort to implement the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Strategy.  This work 
is carried out by the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) 
which falls under the DPA.86 
2.4.2 The role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
According to the UN DPKO website, the DPKO is the main UN organ tasked 
with coordinating peacekeeping operations.  However, it must be noted that 
the Security Council is the organ tasked with deciding when and if a peace-
keeping operations should be deployed.87 The scope and ambit of tasks to be 
undertaken by each operation are based on a Security Council mandate. The 
funding of peacekeeping operations is the responsibility of all UN member 
                                                   
82 See A/47/277 - S/24111 Chapter VI. Available at http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html (Date of 
Use: 15 May 2012). 
83 See United Nations Peacekeeping “Peace and Security”  
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml (Date of Use: 19 March 2012). 




7EJ6Kslovdj_HrSG3g  (Date of Use: 3 March 2012). 
85
 See United Nations, DPA “Role of the DPA” 
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/about/overview (Date of Use: 16 March 2012) 
86 See United Nations, DPA “Role of the DPA” 
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/about/overview (Date of Use: 16 March 2012). 
87
 See United Nations Peacekeeping “Role of the Security Council”   
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml  (Date of Use:20 May2012). 
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states.88 The larger portion of this funding is paid by the five permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council as they have a special responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.89 
Peacekeeping was traditionally established to monitor ceasefires or peace 
agreements with the aim of containing or resolving conflict.  
UN Peacekeeping began in 1948 when the Security Council authorized the 
deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East.90 The mission's role 
was to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neigh-
bours – an operation which became known as the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Even though the UNTSO remains active 
in the Middle East, the UN has deployed an additional 67 peacekeeping mis-
sions to date, with Africa having the largest number of deployments.91 
These peacekeeping missions have been primarily set up to bring about 
peace in conflict areas through non-enforcement action and “to act as an influ-
ence of calm by physically separating warring factions.”92 
As seen in 1.2. above, the span and reach of activities of peacekeeping opera-
tions has greatly expanded.  Their activities not only encompass stabilising 
tense situations in the traditional sense but may now include overseeing elec-
tions, disarming ex-combatants, training of police forces, implementation of 
human rights accords, support for restoration of state authority and support for 
                                                   
88 Article 17 of the Charter provides that (1) The General Assembly shall consider and approve the 
budget of the Organization. (2)The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as 
apportioned by the General Assembly. (3)The General Assembly shall consider and approve any 
financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall 
examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommen-
dations to the agencies concerned.  
89 See A/Res/55/235. 
90 See United Nations Peacekeeping “History of Peacekeeping”   
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/history.shtml (Date of Use: 19 March 2012). 
91 As at 31 December 2012, the UN has deployed a total of 67 peacekeeping operations since 1948.  
See United Nations Peacekeeping “Peacekeeping Fact Sheet” 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml (Date of Use: 29 January 
2013). 
92 See Shaw International Law 1226. 
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social and economic recovery, safe and unobstructed return of refugees and 
displaced persons to their homes.93 
2.5 What ensures a successful peacekeeping operation? 
The inherent success of a peacekeeping operation rests on three principles: 
consent, impartiality and the non-use of force.94 
Consent of the parties: Before a peacekeeping operation can be deployed, con-
sent is required from the main parties to the conflict.  This consent is required 
for the peacekeepers to carry out their mandated tasks without having to pull 
towards enforcement action.95 
Impartiality:  Peacekeeping Operations are required to remain impartial in their 
relations with parties to a conflict. However, they cannot turn a “blind-eye” 
when the principles of the peace process are being undermined or violated by 
parties to the conflict.96 
Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate: Essentially, force 
can only be used as a last resort with authorisation of the Security Council and 
consent of the parties to the conflict.97 
Even in the event that force is used, this use of force cannot be equated to the 
concept of peace enforcement. Peace enforcement may involve the use of mili-
tary force with authorisation of the Security Council but consent from the 
parties to the conflict is not required. 
By relying on the aforementioned principles as a basis for all peacekeeping 
operations, peacekeepers are able to conduct their tasks without having to 
jeopordise their relations with the parties to the conflict and ultimately, the 
peace process. These principles ultimately distinguish UN peacekeeping op-
erations as an instrument for peace and security.98 
                                                   
93 See United Nations Peacekeeping “Mandates and the legal basis of peacekeeping”   
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml  (Date of Use: 18 March 2012). 
94
 See United Nations Peacekeeping “Principles of Peacekeeping” 
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Experience has shown however, that the above principles are not only the only 
factors that determine the success of a peacekeeping operation. Factors such 
as inadequate resources and lack of political will of member states may also 
come into play.99 This could be manifested by member states reluctance to 
provide funding and troops. In addition, ineffective implementation of peace 
agreements and unachievable mandates may also pose problems for peace-
keepers in effectively maintaining the peace.100 Perceived legitimacy and cred-
credibility of the UN peacekeepers by the local population are also important 
factors for success.101 
It is also apparent that the host country‟s reluctance to fully support UN activi-
ties and/or its lack of commitment to work towards the peace process is bound 
to hinder progress or ultimately cause tensions that could have easily been 
contained from spiraling into violent deadly conflicts. 
2.6 Understanding Conflict prevention 
In order to understand conflict prevention, it would seem that it is not sufficient 
to only look out how the various UN departments maintain and keep the peace 
(as seen above) but to also understand what exactly conflict prevention entails. 
Conflict prevention could be defined as any activity taken to stop or reduce the 
risk of a conflict from occurring, “as well as those activities that seek to ad-
dress deep-rooted causes that can lead to conflict in future”102  
Strategies for conflict prevention may fall under three of the following catego-
ries: 
1)  Operational prevention: This type of prevention aims to address immi-
nent crisis by performing activities that will reduce or eliminate 
immediate violence. The aim is very specific and addresses short term 
objectives.  Activities may include negotiation, fact-finding, meeting hu-
                                                   
99
 See Shaw International law 1267. See also United Nations Peacekeeping “Success of Peacekeeping”   
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/history.shtml (Date of Use: 19 March 2012). 
100 See Cousens Conflict Prevention 107. 
101 See United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines 20. Available at  
http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf (Date of Use 8 March 2012). 
102 See Sriram, Martin-Ortega, Hermann War, Conflict and Human Rights 16. 
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manitarian needs and use of sanctions and military pressure. This form 
of prevention is undertaken by security actors such as the UN. 
2) Structural prevention: This type of prevention has a wider perspective.  It 
aims to prevent conflicts by also addressing the root causes of conflict 
like corruption, poverty, governance, use of natural resources and ine-
quality. This form of prevention is generally undertaken by developmen-
developmental and humanitarian actors. 
3) Systematic prevention:  This term was originally coined by then UN Secre-
tary-General, Kofi Annan, and used to address issues that can be dealt 
with efficiently through global partnerships and frameworks on an inter-
national platform.103 The type of issues include illicit arms trade, drug 
trafficking, HIV/AIDS, reduction of environmental degradation, regula-
tion of industries that are known to exacerbate conflict. 
For conflict prevention to be a success, implementation of EWS are of para-
mount importance.  EWS involve three technical processes to monitor 
imminent conflicts: 1) the collection of conflict-relevant data 2) analysis of col-
lected data and 3) transfer of analytical insights into practice.104  Through the 
use and collation of this expert analysis of data, the UN is notified of imminent 
violent tensions or conflicts and is able to determine the best course of action 
to be taken by the international community. Should the Security Council de-
termine that the best course of action is deployment of a peacekeeping 
operation, authorisation for this is attained by adopting a resolution. 
2.7 The challenges of Conflict Prevention 
The UN has had many successes in conflict prevention. However, many of 
them remain unknown.  Some have argued that these accomplishments have 
remained unknown mainly because it is often problematic to define success 
and identify the various shapes success can manifest and also because the 
UN has failed to effectively publicise its own successes.105 Nevertheless, some 
successes have been markedly apparent. For example, the UN has helped 
                                                   
103 See A/60/ 891 5 para 8. 
104
 See Wisler, Ateya “Conflict Early Warning System for Sudan” 8. 
105 See Sriram, Wermester Strengthening UN capacities for the prevention of violent conflict  383. 
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end conflict and restored stability through its peacekeeping missions in coun-
tries such as Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique and 
Tajikistan.106 On a broad spectrum, as far as stopping further bloodshed is 
concerned, it is clear that the involvement of UN peacekeeping operations has 
been generally valuable as they have helped stopped conflicts between op-
posing parties and helped the parties participate in complex peace 
processes.107 
Furthermore, peacekeeping operations have undergone a dramatic change.  
They have moved from lightly armed peacekeepers that classically observed 
and kept the peace to peacekeepers whose tasks have been widened to in-
clude carrying out their tasks by robust means, if necessary, to defend the 
mandate and the civilian population.108 
In spite of these achievements, it would appear that the UN has been implicat-
ed in huge conflict prevention failures such as the genocide in Rwanda and 
Bosnia and the conflict in Angola. 
Is this implication justified? To understand these failures and why the UN was 
implicated, it is preferable to first embark on understanding the full nature of 
the conflict and the context in which it occurred.  To understand the full nature 
of a conflict and the context in which a conflict occurred, for example a conflict 
in Africa, one requires a thorough study of the tribal relations and the country‟s 
colonial history as a starting point. In short, one must first understand the root 
causes of a conflict. 
It follows that to understand the failures of the UN in Rwanda and the current 
challenges in Sudan requires the identification of the causes of the conflicts in 
Sudan and Rwanda and an examination as to whether the UN effectively ad-
dressed them. Where the actions of the UN were considered as having come 
“too late” additional factors such as the decision making process of the UN 
have to be examined.   
                                                   
106 See “Peace-keeping in a changing context” http://www.un.org/docs/SG/SG-Rpt/ch4c.htm (Date of 
Use 3 February 2012). 
107 See Cassese International Law 346. 
108 See Jolly, Emerij, Weis UN Ideas That Changed The World 173. 
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It is apparent from the text and context of the UN Charter that clear decision 
making procedures are in place.109  In spite of this, experience has shown, as 
in the cases of Rwanda and Sudan, that the actions of the UN are not all per-
formed in a timely and effective manner.  The effectiveness of DPKO‟s still 
remains limited.  Some have argued that their core features of consent and 
impartiality sometimes cause these limitations. Even though these features are 
considered the „backbone‟ of a DPKO, the UN has on occasion set up one with 
partial consent i.e. consent has not been granted from all the parties involved 
and thereby affected the principle of impartiality.110  
Also, as pointed out in 1.2 above, steps towards conflicts are sometimes halt-
ed when UN member states, particularly the P5 fail to reach an agreement as 
to when and if a peacekeeping operation should be deployed. Lack of support 
and commitment from member states to deploy a peacekeeping operation of-
ten results in lack of resources and funding which in turn, paralyses the 
peacekeeping process.  
As Luis Druke put it: 
If the money and management problem did not exist and the political will of the 
permanent members of the Security Council and concerned parties were al-
ways consistent, the UN could be more effective in preventing or suppressing 
violent conflicts on the basis of the Charter and subsequent arrangements.111 
The same sentiments were echoed in the Report of the Secretary-General in 
June 2001: 
It is axiomatic that effective preventive action will require sustained political will 
and long-term commitment of resources by Member States and the United Na-
tions system as a whole if a genuine culture of prevention is to take root in the 
international community.112 
                                                   
109 Article 34 of the UN Charter provides that the Security Council and any Member State (by virtue 
of Article 35) may bring to the attention of the Security Council any dispute threatening interna-
tional peace and security. Article 11.3 provides that the General Assembly may call the attention of 
the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security and 
Article 99 confers this responsibility on the Secretary-General. 
110
 See Cassese International Law 345. 
111 See Bauwens, Reychler The Art of Conflict Prevention 41. 1994. 
112
 See A/55/985-S/2001/574. 
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It would thus be appropriate to substantially infer that the delay in response or 
failure to respond to imminent conflicts is often a reflection of the member 
states willingness or lack thereof to cooperate. It would also seem logical to 
infer that the international community cannot lay blame solely on the UN when 
progress in conflict prevention is often halted by the lack of resources and 
funding which are expected from member states. Also, experience has shown 
that member states have sometimes chosen to altogether withdraw their sup-
port in the deployment of an operation. This option was taken in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia and Angola.113 
One could thus deduce that in order for the UN to progress in conflict preven-
tion, it is pivotal for member states to be consistent in their material support 
and demonstrate the political will to prevent conflict even at the expense of 
sabotaging their own personal interests.   
To understand how member states could sometimes be considered as „sabo-
teurs‟ of conflict prevention, a further study of their role in the undertakings of 
the Security Council are discussed in the next chapter. 
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 See “Peace-keeping in a changing context” http://www.un.org/docs/SG/SG-Rpt/ch4c.htm (Date of 
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- 27 - 
3     CHAPTER III THE UN AS A KEY ACTOR IN CONFLICT PREVENTION IN 
AFRICA – THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS MEMBER STATES  
3.1 The Role of the Security Council in conflict prevention 
It could be said that the UN is split up in two.  The first UN comprises of the 
main bodies of the UN, which includes the Security Council, General Assem-
bly, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, International Court of 
Justice and the Secretariat.114  The second UN comprises of several UN spe-
cialised agencies, committees, funds and programmes.115  These two parts 
play instrumental roles in dealing with the world‟s challenges such as peace 
and security, global warming, poverty, HIV/Aids, deforestation, terrorism, hu-
man trafficking, drugs and crime, just to name a few.  As already pointed out 
above, this paper shall examine the work of the UN in conflict prevention vis-à-
vis the first UN, in particular, the Security Council. 
Also, as stated above, the Security Council has been bestowed with the prima-
ry responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.  Its core 
mandate is thus conflict prevention.  This power is derived from Article 24 of 
the Charter.  In bestowing this power on the Council, it was envisioned that the 
Council would help advance human welfare through the prevention of conflict 
among sovereign states. 
Should a threat to peace occur and the complaint is brought to the attention of 
the Council, the Council will first attempt to settle the dispute by peaceful 
means.116 As also pointed out in 1.2 above, this may involve the appointment 
of Special Representatives or call for the Secretary-General to conduct inves-
tigation or mediation in response to the threat.117 Should a violent conflict 
ensue, the Council has the authority to implement a variety of measures from 
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issuing cease-fire directives, enforcement measures, economic sanctions to 
collective military action (see 1.2).118 
3.2 The Security Council and the Charter 
Essentially, the following are the powers conferred on the Council by the Char-
ter: 
Articles 25 and 49 and to some extent Article 2.6, authorise the Council to take 
decisions that are binding on all members of the organization, including its 
non-members.   The types of decisions that can be undertaken are wide as 
they include taking any “measures necessary” to maintain peace and security.  
However, it is notable that this authorisation is limited by the veto rule.   
Article 30 authorises the Council to adopt its own rules of procedure which are 
subject to the Charter. 
The Charter also grants the Council power to regulate armaments with the as-
sistance of the Military Staff Committee. In this respect, Article 26 provides 
that:  
In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace 
and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and 
economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, 
with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, 
plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establish-
ment of a system for the regulation of armaments. 
Additionally, the Council may make recommendations on the admission of new 
members and appointment of the Secretary-General.119 
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3.3 How relevant is the Charter in today’s world? 
The Charter was signed at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 at a time 
when the world had just experienced devastating effects of two world wars.  
The preamble of the Charter outlines its purpose as follows: 
We the peoples of the United Nations determined 
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-
time has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and 
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the hu-
man person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and 
small, and 
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations aris-
ing from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and 
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom 
By and large, the moral purpose echoed above has very much remained what 
drives the UN today.  However, it would appear that this preamble contradicts 
some provisions in the Charter. For instance, the preamble affirms the equal 
rights of nations, large and small and yet it confers the right to veto in substan-
tive proposals in the Council only on the P5.  The right to amend the Charter is 
also requires the concurring vote of the P5 as provided in Articles 27.3 and 
108 respectively.   
Another issue worthy of note is the issue of intervention.  Article 2.7 prohibits 
the intervention of matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of a State.  
On the other hand, Articles 55 and 56 call upon members to take joint action to 
ensure human rights for all. 
Needless to say, through the advancement of international law, the issue of 
intervention in matters relating to human rights is now an issue that the majori-
ty of the international community have come to advocate and continue to 
develop. This has been particularly evident in the “Responsibility to Protect” 
principle which fundamentally establishes that “Sovereignty no longer exclu-
sively protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of responsibility 
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that holds States accountable for the welfare of their people”.120  It could thus 
be interpreted that Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter now enjoy priority over Ar-
ticle 2.7 when it involves the protection of populations from genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and/or incitement of the 
aforementioned crimes. 
However, the exclusive powers of the P5 and their use remain subjects of 
great debate to this today.  Those in contention have often felt that the idea 
that peace and security can only be effectively achieved through the co-
operation of the five great powers is an idea that was plausible in the 40‟s but 
not today.121 Moreover, the fact that the P5 are able to use their prerogative to 
derail any substantive resolution irrespective of the international support gar-
nered has caused further controversy.  On balance, it would seem that the 
main grievance of the non-permanent member states lies with the Charter‟s 
failure to avail equal voting rights to sovereign states.  
In spite of the above criticism, the Charter remains a valid and binding consti-
tution on the international community.  
3.3.1 Members of the Security Council and the Veto 
The UN was created on the basis that the Great powers would lead the organ-
isation.122  Today, the Council consists of fifteen members, five of which are 
permanent (P5).  The ten non-permanent members are elected by the General 
Assembly every two years (see Article 23 of the Charter).  The Council is 
headed by a President who holds office for a period of one month and each 
tenure of presidency is held by a different member of the Council.123 
Article 27 of the Charter outlines the voting procedure of its member as fol-
lows: 
a. Each member state of the Council has one vote.  
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 See Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide “Responsibility to Protect” (Date of 
Use: 18 May 2012).  See also A/60/1 paras 138-140 and A/63/77.  
121 See Bailey The procedure of the UN Security Council  107. 
122 See Cassese International Law 319. 
123
 See United Nations “Security Council Members” http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp (Date of Use 
8 April 2012). 
- 31 - 
b. Decisions on substantive matters require the concurring votes of the P5 
and four votes from the non-permanent members.  
Furthermore, as conferred by the Charter, any decision taken by the council is 
binding on all member states of the United Nations.124 If a state is party to a 
dispute and not represented on the Council, it may be invited to participate in 
Security Council deliberations.  However, such parties (members and non-
members) are required to abstain from voting (see paragraph 3 under Article 
27).125 
Membership of the Council has often come under scrutiny.  The idea that the 
maintenance of peace and security ultimately lies in the hands of five states is 
one that has received resistance from the time of the Charter‟s formulation to 
present day.  Some authors have pointed out that had the UN been formed in 
more recent times, the likelihood that the P5 would be given permanent mem-
bership and veto rights would be very slim or next to impossible.126 Given the 
number of contending views and the general feeling that the veto has been 
misused in order to further self-interested purposes, a number of proposals 
have been made over the years to balance the concept of permanent mem-
bers having such elevated power.  The following are examples of 
recommendations that have been brought before the General Assembly: 
1. The structure of the council should mirror „current realities‟.127  The sup-
porters of this type of reform have proposed various ways of achieving 
this.  The most dominant views suggest that the Council increase its 
members from 15 to as many as 27 members.128  Other delegations 
have also been of the opinion that the council‟s representation in 1963 
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was well-balanced and accordingly efforts should be made to reflect 
membership representation of that year.129 
2. Introduction of new permanent members.   Suggestions to extend per-
manent membership to industrialised and developing countries have 
also been brought forward. Countries that have been proposed over the 
years include India, Brazil, Germany, South Africa and Japan.130  In this 
respect, it has been envisioned that permanent membership would in-
crease from five to ten or eleven permanent members.  Then again, 
some countries have objected to the addition of these members.  For 
instance, Pakistan has objected to the permanent membership of India; 
Italy and Spain‟s objection has been directed towards Germany; Argen-
tina and Mexico to Brazil; and South Korea has opposed the admittance 
of Japan as a permanent member.131 It follows that since no agreement 
can easily be reached among regional groups as to which countries 
should be the new permanent members, it has been suggested that an 
increase in non-permanent members would equally encourage wider 
representativity and cause less controversy.132  In looking at whether 
these proposed reforms would be viable, many delegations stressed 
the importance of establishing whether such expansions would result in 
greater „efficiency‟ and „effectiveness‟ of the Council.133  
3. Limit the scope of veto use or abolish it.  Some delegations have 
brought proposals forward to limit the use of the veto to matters related 
to resolutions under chapter VII of the Charter or entirely abolish it.134  
In the event that Council membership was expanded, some delegations 
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have suggested that this prerogative is not extended to the new perma-
nent members.135 
The above recommendations are entirely or in some respect sound.  However, 
it would seem that the objections of states and their ensuing recommendations 
have not led to the obliteration of the veto or changes in the composition of the 
Council as yet.  The reason for this lies in the Charter itself.  Any changes or 
amendments to the Charter would require the two thirds of the UN member 
votes including the P5 (see Article 108 of the Charter). It is thus hardly surpris-
ing that no amendments relating to the veto have been made to date.  Any 
amendment would require that the P5 themselves become open to relinquish-
ing their veto right or share it with other states. 
3.3.2 Africa and the veto 
As has been pointed out in 3.3.1, various recommendations have been 
brought forward to limit or abolish the veto.  Arguably, the member state inac-
tion that emanates from the use of the veto has often led to the loss of 
hundreds of thousands of lives. In many respects, the adverse effects of the 
veto affect Africa the most mainly because Africa experiences the greatest 
number of internal armed conflict in the world (see 2.3).  Consequently, the 
continent‟s problems have appeared on the Council‟s agenda more than any 
other region.   
The two cases that exemplify the adverse effects of the veto in Africa are the 
Rwandan genocide and the crisis in Darfur.  With respect to the Rwandan 
genocide, no actual veto was used. However, the threat of the veto and influ-
ence of some of the P5 (France, US and the UK) resulted in the Council‟s 
failure to deploy a reinforced peacekeeping force after the genocide began.136 
As for the crisis in Darfur, Russia and China‟s threat to veto are considered to 
be the reason why the Council has taken less than robust action against the 
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government of Sudan.137 Again, with the case of Darfur, no actual veto was 
cast.  However, this chapter, in particular, paragraphs 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 will 
demonstrate the various ways action can be derailed by use of the veto as 
well as outline the instances where the P5 have threatened to use a veto. That 
said, it should be noted that even though Africa‟s issues appear in the Coun-
cil‟s agenda more than any other region, it is striking that Africa is not repre-
represented in the permanent category.  Would the inclusion of an African 
state as a permanent member enable the Council to address Africa‟s conflict in 
a much more efficient manner?  This question will be addressed in the last 
Chapter of this paper. For purposes of limiting the scope of this paper, the dis-
cussions that follow vis-à-vis the veto will be analysed within the context of 
Africa. 
3.3.3 The Rationale of the Veto 
The history of the veto dates back to the San Francisco Conference of 1945.  
As mentioned in 3.3 above, the time at which the conference took place was a 
period in which the world was fragile.  It thus became extremely important to 
nations around the world that every effort was made to recover from the dev-
astating effects of war.  However, during this recovery process, it became 
abundantly clear that recovery could only be achieved through the work of a 
few powerful states. The United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, 
China and France were the only states that had the power and resources to 
assist in the rehabilitation process.138  It was also recognised that only these 
states could make the idea of a political body such as the UN effectively 
work.139 In recognising the powers and influence these five states had, it was 
essential that the Charter conferred on them special rights and responsibilities 
which would ensure that they acted as one in spite of their “historical differ-
ences”.140  The establishment of the veto rule or “great power unanimity" as it 
is sometimes referred to, appeared to be a mechanism that would ensure con-
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tinuous cooperation among the Five in issues of world peace and security.  
Each of the powers believed that the use of this rule ensured that they could 
act together as a formidable force against any plans or recommendations that 
would be against their interests.141  
Fundamentally, the speeches made by the various representatives of the Five 
outline the rationale of the veto: 
For example the representative of China said: 
Starting from the premise that everyone desired to make the Security Council 
a strong and effective organ, there was no choice but to support the rule of 
unanimity as essential for its strength and its effectiveness.  The alternative 
was a voting system which, though it might be more perfect, could in any giv-
en moment, weaken the Council in efforts to act promptly and effectively.  It 
was a clear choice between a more or less ideal system of voting and one re-
quiring unanimity for effective decisions.142 
The United Kingdom representative pointed out: 
The present voting provisions were in the interests of, broadly judged, of all 
states and not merely the permanent members of the Security Council.  Peace 
must rest on the unanimity of the great powers for without it whatever was built 
would be built upon shifting sands, of no more value than the paper upon 
which it was written.  The unanimity of the great powers was a hard fact but an 
inescapable one.  The veto power was a means of preserving that unanimity, 
and far from being a menace to the small powers, it was their essential safe-
guard.143 
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The representative from the United States was of the opinion that “the great 
powers could preserve the peace of the world if united but they could not do 
so if dissension were sowed among them”.144 
After much deliberation and in spite of resistance from the smaller powers, it 
was decided that the concurring vote of the Five was mandatory in respect of 
the Security Council‟s substantive decisions relating to peace and security. 
This decision was consequently enshrined in Article 27 of the Charter and re-
mains a subject of debate to this day.  Moreover, as already pointed out above, 
the veto right can only be taken away or amended through the concurrent 
agreement of the Five as provided by Article 108 of the Charter.  Article 108 
provides that: 
Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the 
United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the mem-
bers of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective 
constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, in-
cluding all the permanent members of the Security Council.  
In effect, the “veto guarded the veto”.145   
In the years that followed, various views, debates and proposals have been 
made to challenge this exclusive power of the Five.  The P5 themselves have 
held different views in respect of the veto rule.  For the Russians, they have 
shown continuous support the rule of unanimity as a means of ensuring that 
the western powers did not use “new international machinery” against them.146 
The Americans also viewed the veto rule favourably and continued to support 
the rule.  The British on the other hand, began to lean away from this rule 
mainly because the small states in the commonwealth did not agree with the 
idea of having the “great powers essentially run the world through the Council 
and yet immunize themselves by using the veto”.147 However, the P5 have yet 
to explicitly express an inclination to amend the Charter in the areas related to 
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the veto rule.  So, it could be safe to deduce that this rule will remain in effect 
for some time to come. 
Historically, the veto rule has been used by the P5 for various reasons.  More 
often than not, the reasons have been seen to be self-serving or used as a 
means of expressing indifference or outrage with the Council.  For example, in 
the first few months that the Council was operative, the Soviets had felt isolat-
ed and used the veto seventeen times by the summer of 1948 as a means of 
expressing their outrage.148 The following section further examines the use of 
the veto power by the P5. 
3.3.4 Use of the veto power 
At the time of writing this Chapter, a total of 269 vetoes have been used since 
the UN Charter was signed in 1946.149  Considering the vast issues that have 
been brought before the Council, this number may not seem entirely out of the 
norm.   
Typically, when peace and security are threatened, the Council is involved in a 
number of informal consultations to ascertain the type of response required.  
During such consultations, there have been instances where the P5 have 
threatened to use the veto which consequently led to the Council‟s inability to 
bring certain issues forward for deliberation.150 Regrettably, statistics surround-
ing such practices are difficult to collate since the threat to use a veto would 
only come about in closed informal consultations and not open meetings of the 
Council. 
The following are the areas in which an actual negative vote has been used: 
a) Vetoes on political questions and situations151  
b) Vetoes on membership152 
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c) Vetoes on UN matters and operations153 
To better understand the use of the veto, it is important to bear in mind that this 
negative vote can only be used against entire draft resolutions or paragraphs 
of draft resolutions or amendments.   
Having said that, the uses of the veto by the P5 will now be individually looked 
at: 
Russia 
Russia has used the veto more times than any other permanent 
ber.154 Since 1946, the USSR/Russia has used the veto127 times.155 Most of 
these vetoes were taken prior to the end of the cold war. The Russians exer-
cised the veto predominantly in matters related to political questions and 
admission of members.156 It is interesting to note that between 1946 and 2004, 
Russia had said “no” to the membership of 16 states which included Japan, 
Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Austria, just to name a few.157 Their objections 
to political questions included but were not limited to the situations in Cyprus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Middle East, India-Pakistan, Congo, Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary and also questions related to Greece, Spain, Palestine, US-
Iran hostage, South Africa.158  They also put in their negative vote with respect 
to various paragraphs of draft resolutions or amendments. 
Based on the above, it is not an easy feat to deduce the type of issues that 
Russia is likely to veto.  It could, however, be said that their use of the veto 
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United States of America 
The United States has used the veto a total of 83 times.159  It would appear 
that a vast majority of these vetoes have been used in regard to issues in the 
Middle East.160  It follows that these vetoes could be been seen as a means of 
affirming the United States position as Israel‟s ally and/or as a means of pro-
tecting their interests in the Middle East.   
In addition to issues related to the Middle East, the United States has used the 
veto to curtail action related to situations in countries like Grenada, Namibia, 
South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).161  With respect to mem-
bership, the United States used the veto to object to the admissions of 
Vietnam and Angola as new members.162 
Given the above, it would be safe to deduce that the US predominantly uses 
the veto in cases related to its interests in the Middle East. 
United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom has used the veto 32 times.163  A vast majority of these 
vetoes were in response to draft resolutions related to the situations in Namib-
ia, Panama, South Africa, Falklands Islands and Southern Rhodesia and 
problems related to the Palestinian question. The veto statistics reveal that on 
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France 
France has used its prerogative 18 times.164  These matters have included the 
situations in Panama, Namibia, Comoros and South Africa.165  It has also used 
the veto in questions relating to Palestine and the relationship between the UN 
and South Africa.166  
China 
By contrast, China has only used the veto 8 times.167  However, it should be 
noted that between 1946 and 1971, China‟s seat at the Security Council was 
occupied by the Republic of China (Taiwan).168  In this period, the veto was 
only used once to object to the admission of Mongolia into the UN. 
China has used its prerogative sparingly in matters such as the situations in 
Macedonia, the Middle East and expressed its objection towards the admis-
sion of Bangladesh as a member.169 
Strikingly, China has used its veto in conjunction with Russia on a majority of 
occasions. The most recent veto cast with Russia is the one relating to the sit-
uation in Syria.170  
In spite of the negativity that has surrounded the veto, it is worth looking at the 
number of times the Council has passed successful resolutions.   
 
First, it must be pointed out that the views echoed in this paper point to the fact 
that internal armed conflicts increased after the end of the cold war which 
would consequently lead to the expansion of the Council‟s role and ultimately 
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the number of resolutions passed.  Therefore, one should bear this in mind 
when looking at the Council‟s successful resolutions versus the derailed reso-
lutions.  Joel Wuthnow‟s171 summary findings indicate that in between the 
periods 1990 and 2008, the Council had held meetings at least 166.1 times in 
a year and had succeeded in implementing the measures under Chapter VII 
on countries such as Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, 
Congo, Sierra Leone, North Korea, Iran and Afghanistan.172 In addition, the 
council had managed to dispatch 45 peacekeeping operations in countries like 
Rwanda, Haiti, Kosovo, East Timor, and Sudan.173  
 
The statistics that have been given thus far have not included the “hidden ve-
to” or the number of times the P5 have abstained from voting.  With abstention 
from voting, a resolution can be passed if a permanent member abstains from 
a vote. However, a proposal is susceptible to defeat if enough abstentions are 
secured.174  It follows that this kind of mechanism or practice is known as the 
“hidden veto” or the “indirect veto”.175  Having said that, the fact that a state 
like China has only cast the veto 8 times, does not necessarily mean that it 
has supported a majority of proposals brought before the Council.  Experience 
has shown that although China has not cast a plethora of negative votes, it 
has withheld its vote on pertinent peace and security issues that have pre-
vented a number of resolutions from being adopted. 
 
As already pointed out, the aim of this chapter is to gain a better understand-
ing of the Council‟s work in the context of Africa.  Accordingly, the examples 
below illustrate the cases where the P5 abstained from voting in order to pre-
vent the Council from adopting a resolution that was related to peace and 
security on the continent: 
 
                                                   




174 See Patil The UN Veto in World Affairs 1946-1990 17. This practice allows a proposal to be rejected 
without a negative vote being cast by one of the P5. It only requires the persuasion of enough Council 
members i.e. 7 in a council of 15 to abstain or vote against. 
175 Ibid. 
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a) Security Council resolution 929 (1994) on establishment of a temporary 
multinational operation for humanitarian purposes in Rwanda until the de-
ployment of the expanded UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda.  In this 
resolution, China was the only P5 to abstain from voting.176 The reasoning 
behind their abstention is that that consent of all parties to the conflict was 
not secured.177 
b) Security Council resolution 955 (1994) on establishment of an Interna-
tional Tribunal for Rwanda and adoption of the Statute of the Tribunal.  
China was the only member of the Council to abstain from voting.178   
c) Security Council resolution 1054(1996) on sanctions against the Sudan 
in connection with non-compliance with Security Council resolution 1044 
(1996) demanding extradition to Ethiopia of the three suspects wanted in 
connection with assassination attempt on President Mubarak of Egypt.  No 
negative vote was cast but China and Russia were the only members that 
abstained from voting.179 
d) Security Council resolution 1070 (1996) imposing air sanctions against 
the Sudan to reinforce implementation of Security Council resolutions 1044 
(1996) and 1054 (1996).  No negative vote cast but China and Russia were 
the only members that abstained from voting.180 
                                                   





oper=%3D&ullimit=&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&sort=&x=12&y=14#focus (Date of Use: 9 May 
2012). 
177 See Wuthnow Beyond the Veto: Chinese Diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council 373. 
178 Detailed voting of the S/955 available at: 
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=1336K4T131T97.59039&limitbox_1=VI01+%3D+
vi_s&menu=search&aspect=power&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=voting&ri=2&source=%7E%21h
orizon&index=.VM&term=955&aspect=power#focus  (Date of Use: 9 May 2012). 
179 See detailed voting of S/1054 available at: 
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=1336K4T131T97.59039&limitbox_1=VI01+%3D+
vi_s&menu=search&aspect=power&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=voting&ri=10&source=%7E%21
horizon&index=.VM&term=1054&aspect=power#focus (Date of Use: 9 May 2012). 
180 See detailed voting of S/1070 available at: 
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=1336K4T131T97.59039&limitbox_1=VI01+%3D+
vi_s&menu=search&aspect=power&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=voting&ri=11&source=%7E%21
horizon&index=.VM&term=1070&aspect=power#focus (Date of Use: 9 May 2012). 
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e) Security Council resolution 1556 (2004) on endorsing the deployment of 
international monitors and imposing an arms embargo against the Sudan.  
China was the only permanent member to abstain from voting.181 
f) Security Council resolution 1564 (2004) on expanding the monitoring 
mission in Darfur and on the establishment of an international commission 
of inquiry to investigate human rights abuses in the Sudan. China and Rus-
sia were the only permanent members to abstain from voting.182 
g) Security Council resolution 1591 (2005) on establishment of a Security 
Council Committee to monitor implementation of the measures in Darfur.  
China and Russia were the only permanent members to abstain from vot-
ing.183 
h) Security Council resolution 1593 (2005) referring the situation in Darfur 
since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. 
China and the United States were the only permanent members to abstain 
from voting and no negative votes were cast.184 
i) Security Council resolution1672 (2006) on implementation of measures 
specified in paragraph 3 of resolution 1591(2005) with respect to Sudanese 
individuals.  Here no negative votes were cast except that China and Rus-
sia abstained from voting.185 
j) Security Council resolution 1706 (2006) on expansion of the mandate of 
the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to support the implementation of the 
                                                   
181 See detailed voting of S/1556 available at: 
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=1336K4T131T97.59039&limitbox_1=VI01+%3D+
vi_s&menu=search&aspect=power&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=voting&ri=12&source=%7E%21
horizon&index=.VM&term=1556&aspect=power#focus (Date of Use: 9 May 2012). 
182 See detailed voting of S/1564 available at: 
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=1336K4T131T97.59039&limitbox_1=VI01+%3D+
vi_s&menu=search&aspect=power&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=voting&ri=13&source=%7E%21
horizon&index=.VM&term=1564&aspect=power&x=7&y=14#focus (Date of Use: 9 May 2012). 
183 See detailed voting of S/1591 available at: 
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=1336K4T131T97.59039&limitbox_1=VI01+%3D+
vi_s&menu=search&aspect=power&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=voting&ri=14&source=%7E%21
horizon&index=.VM&term=1591&aspect=power&x=14&y=10#focus (Date of Use: 9 May 2012). 
184 See detailed voting of S/1593 available at: 
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=1336K4T131T97.59039&limitbox_1=VI01+%3D+
vi_s&menu=search&aspect=power&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=voting&ri=15&source=%7E%21
horizon&index=.VM&term=1593&aspect=power&x=12&y=6#focus (Date of Use: 9 May 2012). 
185 See detailed voting of S/1672 available at: 
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=1336K4T131T97.59039&limitbox_1=VI01+%3D+
vi_s&menu=search&aspect=power&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=voting&ri=17&source=%7E%21
horizon&index=.VM&term=1672&aspect=power#focus (Date of Use: 9 May 2012). 
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Darfur Peace Agreement. No negative votes were cast but China and Rus-
sia were the only permanent members to abstain from voting.186 
k) Security Council resolution 1828 (2008) on extension of the mandate of 
the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).  
The United States was the only member to abstain from voting and there 
was no record of a negative vote.187 
 
The reasoning behind the abstentions in the above instances has ranged from 
the P5 or non-permanent members respect for sovereignty; reluctance to 
adopt a resolution without the consent of all parties concerned; concerns relat-
ed to the use of UN of forces or the Council‟s application of Chapter VII to 
concerns that any measures taken under the resolution would be to the detri-
ment of the peacemaking process.188 
3.3.5 Other forms of derailing a resolution 
On close scrutiny, it appears that the veto has many facets.  First, as already 
pointed out, there have been instances where the P5 have threatened to use 
the veto during informal consultations of the Council which consequently led to 
the Council‟s inability to bring certain issues forward for deliberation. Second, 
the P5 have on several occasion chosen to abstain from voting which princi-
pally has the potential to prevent the adoption of a resolution provided that a 
sufficient number of abstentions has been secured (see discussion in 3.3.3 
above). 
 
With regard to the threats to use a veto, such threats have often led to the re-
moval of pertinent issues from the Council‟s agenda.  Experience has shown 
that topics that were susceptible to a veto from any of the Five would either be 
                                                   
186 See detailed voting of S/1706 available at: 
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=1336K4T131T97.59039&limitbox_1=VI01+%3D+
vi_s&menu=search&aspect=power&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=voting&ri=19&source=%7E%21
horizon&index=.VM&term=1706&aspect=power&x=7&y=13#focus (Date of Use: 9 May 2012).  
187 See detailed voting of S/1828 available at: 
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=1336K4T131T97.59039&profile=voting&uri=full=
3100023~!869436~!17&ri=21&aspect=power&menu=search&source=~!horizon#focus (Date of Use: 9 
May 2012). 
188 See Wuthnow “Beyond the Veto: Chinese Diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council” 368. 
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removed or amended from the agenda to appease the interests of the P5.189 
The resolutions that would be amended for this reason would often lack the 
strong and concise language required to condemn the actions of parties in-
volved in a conflict.190  In some cases, the Council failed to impose Chapter VII 
measures even when the situation so warranted.  
 
In addition to this, such practises have sometimes led to the delay and/or ob-
struction of the Council‟s ability to respond to a crisis in an effective and timely 
manner.191  The threat of veto by France and the US in the case of Rwanda 
helps illustrate this. 
   
Paris and Washington not only blocked UN action, but also used their hidden 
veto to weaken the definition of the crisis under international law.  The Security 
Council could not even pass a resolution containing the word "genocide," 
which would have required intervention by parties to the 1951 Genocide Con-
vention. Only after the worst months of the killing did the Security Council 
endorse Opération Turquoise, a deployment of French troops as a "humanitar-
ian" mission under the UN flag.192 
 
The above situation succinctly demonstrates how such threats ultimately jeop-
ardise the Council‟s work without the actual use of a negative vote.  On the 
whole, one could say that the Council‟s ability to tackle conflict and respond to 
it in a timeous and effective manner would be greatly increased if they did not 
have to also deal with the „threat of the veto‟ looming over every proposed 
resolution. 
 
Regretfully, the Council has often reacted or prioritised threats to peace based 
on the individual interests of member states.  It is apparent from the aforemen-
                                                   
189  See Nahory “The Hidden Veto” May 2004. Available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/185/42656.html  (Date of Use: 19 May 
2012). 
190 See Nahory “The Hidden Veto” May 2004. Available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/185/42656.html  (Date of Use: 19 May 
2012). 
191 Ibid. 
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tioned discussions that the veto and its various forms need to be continually 
challenged. Its existence and use continue to pose tremendous challenges to 
the Council, particularly relating to conflicts in Africa. As evidenced in the cas-
es of Rwanda and Sudan, the use of the veto or its various forms could 
sometimes also lead to the loss of many lives. 
3.4 Change the conduct of voting and admit new members? 
In sum, it would seem that the Council, although it has greatly advanced within 
the domain of conflict prevention, continues to face challenges with respect to 
its composition and conduct of voting.  
Apart from the power they derive from the veto, the P5 enjoy other privileges.  
For instance, they have guaranteed representation in any UN committee and 
have access to a wealth of information.193  Most markedly, they have the ability 
to exert influence on world events and ordinarily have the upper hand in multi-
lateral and bilateral negotiations.194 So, it is hardly surprising that the P5 have 
not shown any willingness to amend the Charter in this respect.   
One should not, however, assume that there exists no possibility of reform with 
respect to the Council‟s membership and the veto.  Essentially, there is a 
pressing need – in the area of international law – to keep a balance between 
the Charter and equitable representation in the Council and translate that into 
current realities. 
It is for this reason that an open-ended working group was established in 1993 
to consider the “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the 
membership of the Security Council”.195 The possibilities of Council reform, if 
any, will be evaluated from the standpoint of this working group.   
This paper will attempt to analyse these possibilities by drawing from the work-
ing groups findings and recommendations, whilst also attempting to provide a 
better glimpse into the P5‟s attitude towards this type of reform. The scope and 
                                                                                                                                                  
192
 See Nahory “The Hidden Veto” May 2004. Available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/185/42656.html  (Date of Use: 19 May 
2012). 
193 See Franek, Morrison “Restructuring the Security Council”.  Available at 
http://www.munfw.org/archive/45th/cr2.htm (Date of Use: 18 May 2012). 
194 Ibid. 
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work of the working group will also be indicative of the convictions of other 
member states intention to make changes in this area. Before discussing the 
likelihood of Council reform, it is fitting to first discuss the cases of Rwanda 
and Sudan in-depth. 
 Accordingly, the findings and recommendations of the working group will be 
discussed in great detail under Chapter VI of this paper. 
                                                                                                                                                  
195 See GA/Res 48/26. 
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4 CHAPTER IV THE UN IN RWANDA: LESSONS LEARNT ON THE 
PREVENTION OF ARMED CONFLICT 
4.1 Revisiting the Genocide in Rwanda 
The genocide in Rwanda should never have happened. But it did.  The interna-
tional community failed in Rwanda, and that must leave us always with a sense 
of bitter regret and abiding sorrow.  If the international community had acted 
promptly and with determination, it could have stopped most of the killing. But 
the political will was not there, nor were troops.  If the United Nations, govern-
ment officials, the international media and other observers had paid more 
attention to the gathering signs of disaster, and taken timely actions, it might 
have been averted. Warnings were missed.196 
The above paragraph echoes the general feeling shared by many among the 
international community that more should have and could have been done to 
prevent the genocide in Rwanda. Many scholars and experts have written ex-
tensively on the subject and given their opinion as to what went wrong and 
why Rwanda could justifiably be considered the biggest failure of the UN.  In 
order to give an accurate account of what happened, this chapter heavily re-
lies on the report of the independent inquiry into the actions of the UN during 
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Carlsson report) as the basis of its analysis 
(see 1.1.1 above on where to access Carlsson report). 
The report provides an in-depth analysis of the events leading up to the geno-
cide, the genocide itself and how the UN responded to this.  In doing so, the 
report extensively discusses the various factors that played a role in what 
could be termed as one of the biggest failures of the UN.  Even though all the 
factors extensively discussed in the report could be considered to have equally 
attributed to the UN's failure, this chapter will attempt to draw on the reports 
analysis primarily within the context of the member states reaction to the con-
flict in Rwanda. 
                                                   
196
 Kofi Annan’s remarks at the Memorial Conference on the Rwanda Genocide, organized by the Gov-
ernment of Canada and Rwanda in New York, 26 March 2004.  See SG/SM/9223 for the full speech. 
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4.2 Brief history of the Tutsi-Hutu relations 
 
As already pointed out in 1.2 and 2.3.2, the dynamics between the Tutsi and 
Hutu was one that had on-going tensions that could be dated back to 
Rwanda's colonial era.  During Belgian rule, it is believed that the Belgians fa-
voured the Tutsi's over the Hutu's.  For instance, even though the Tutsi were 
the minority, they had better access to jobs and education.197 This favouritism 
was based on “racial ideology”.198 The Belgians were of the opinion that the 
Tutsi‟s were more refined and thus more superior to the Hutu‟s.199 The differ-
ences between the two tribes were subsequently “reinforced through the 
introduction of identity cards in 1931, which indicated ethnicity”.200 However, in 
the years leading up to Rwanda's independence, the liberation struggle was 
pioneered by the Tutsi which consequently led the Belgians to turn their favour 
on the Hutu's instead.201 The Hutus used this 'change in wind' to embark on 
massacres that killed about 10 000 Tutsi's between 1959 and 1962 and result-
ed in more than 100 000 Tutsi's fleeing into Uganda and Burundi.202  
After Rwanda gained independence in 1962, the relations between the two 
tribes continued to be highly volatile as evidenced by sporadic outbreaks of 
violence.203 Most of these sporadic outbreaks of violence were attempts made 
by the Tutsi's to restrain the domination of the Hutu and secure their right to 
return to Rwanda.204  It is against this backdrop that the already existing ten-
sion intensified between the two tribes and eventually led to the civil war in 
1990.   
                                                   
197  See Hilker “The Role of Education in driving conflict and building peace: The case of Rwanda” 5. 
198 See Bigagaza, Abong, Mukarubuga Land Scarcity, Distribution and Conflict in Rwanda 53. 
199 See Mayersen “Race Relations in Rwanda: An Historical perspective”3. Available at 
http://www.polsis.uq.edu.au/docs/Challenging-Politics-
Papers/Deborah_Mayersen_Race_Relations_in_Rwanda.pdf (Date of Use: 22 July 2012). 
200 See Bigagaza, Abong, Mukarubuga Land Scarcity, Distribution and Conflict in Rwanda 53. 
201 See Shalom “The Rwanda Genocide: The Nightmare That Happened”1. Available at 
http://www.wpunj.edu/cohss/departments/pol_sci/faculty/shalom/the-rwandan-genocide-.dot (Date 
of Use: 3 August 2012). See also Wage, Haigh “A Case Study on the Arusha Peace Agreement” 4. 
202 Ibid. See also Wage, Haigh “A Case Study on the Arusha Peace Agreement” 4. 
203 See Shalom “The Rwanda Genocide: The Nightmare That Happened” 2. Available at 
http://www.wpunj.edu/cohss/departments/pol_sci/faculty/shalom/the-rwandan-genocide-.dot (Date 
of Use: 3 August 2012). 
204 Ibid. 
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The civil war in Rwanda took place from 1990 to 1994 and the parties to the 
civil war were the government of Rwanda, led by Mr Juvenal Habyarimana 
and the rebel group, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF).205 Peace talks be-
tween the two parties took place over a number of years and culminated in the 
signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement which on 4 August 1993.206 This 
agreement, also referred to as the Arusha Peace Accords, consisted of five 
protocols that set out the terms of the cease fire agreement between the gov-
ernment of Rwanda and the RPF.207  
Fundamentally, the agreement was based on five pillars: 
1. The establishment of the rule of law208 
2. Power-sharing209 
3. Repatriation and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced peo-
ple210  
4. The integration of armed forces211 
5. and other miscellaneous provisions212 
                                                   
205 The RPF was formed “against a backdrop of entrenched divisive and genocide ideology, repeated 
massacres, the persistent problems of refugees in the Diaspora, and the lack of avenues for peaceful 
political change” in 1979 under the name, the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU) and later 
became the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1987. RPF was formed by Rwandans or descendants of 
Rwandans who had fled Rwanda in the late 50’s and early 60’s and who were never allowed to return 
to Rwanda. Consequently, they led difficult lives as refugees and formed the RPF in order to rally 
Rwandans to address it existing issues and secure their right to return to their homeland.  See Republic 
of Rwanda “Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF)” http://www.gov.rw/THE-RWANDESE-PATRIOTIC-FRONT-
RPF?lang=en  (Date of Use: 29 August 2012). 
206
 See Republic of Rwanda “Arusha Peace Agreement” http://www.gov.rw/THE-ARUSHA-PEACE-
AGREEMENT?lang=en (Date of Use: 23 August 2012). 
207 Ibid. 
208 See Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the RPF on the 
Rule of Law signed at Arusha on 18 August 1992. See also Republic of Rwanda “Arusha Peace 
Agreement” http://www.gov.rw/THE-ARUSHA-PEACE-AGREEMENT?lang=en (Date of Use: 23 August 
2012). 
209 See Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional 
Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the RPF signed at Arusha on 30 
October 1992. See also Republic of Rwanda “Arusha Peace Agreement” http://www.gov.rw/THE-
ARUSHA-PEACE-AGREEMENT?lang=en (Date of Use: 23 August 2012).  
210 See Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the RPF on the 
Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons signed at Arusha on 9 
June 1993. See also Republic of Rwanda “Arusha Peace Agreement” http://www.gov.rw/THE-ARUSHA-
PEACE-AGREEMENT?lang=en (Date of Use: 23 August 2012).  
211 See Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the RPF on the 
Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties signed at Arusha on 3 August 1993.  See also Re-
public of Rwanda “Arusha Peace Agreement” http://www.gov.rw/THE-ARUSHA-PEACE-
AGREEMENT?lang=en (Date of Use: 23 August 2012). 
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In essence, the agreement "provided the two parties with the appropriate 
framework for setting up transitional institutions designed to consolidate politi-
cal pluralism and the on-going democratic process in Rwanda."213 The 
agreement and its protocols not only contained various provisions that were 
drawn up to assist in brokering long lasting peace between the two parties but 
also laid down the UN's role in the implementation of the same.214  The Securi-
ty Council in response to its newly appointed role adopted resolution 872 in 
October 1993 and consequently set up UNAMIR which consisted of about 
2500 military personnel.215  UNAMIR's core mandate was to act as an observ-
er of the cease-fire.216 In addition to this, the UNAMIR was to: 
a)  Ensure the security of the capital, Kigali.217  
b)  The security situation generally up to the installation of the new govern-
ment.218 
4.3 UN activities in Rwanda before the genocide 
 
In the months that followed the deployment of UNAMIR, a series of events 
took place that were a cause for concern to the peacekeeping operation itself 
and the people of Rwanda. In spite of the optimism created by the Arusha 
Agreement, the security situation in Rwanda continued to deteriorate. For in-
stance, only a week after signing the agreement, the special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights had already reported to the UN the existence of 
“massacres and a plethora of other serious human rights violations in Rwanda” 
during his visit there.219   
                                                                                                                                                  
212 See Protocol of Agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF on Miscellaneous 
Issues and Final Provisions signed at Arusha on 3 August 1993. 
213 See S/PV 3288, speech of Mr Anastase Gasana, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of 
Rwanda. Available at 
http://www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/collect/usdocs/index/assoc/HASH2284/6ea6eec8.dir/
1140.pdf (Date of Use: 29 July 2012). 
214
 See S/Res 872. 
215 Ibid.  See also Dallaire, Poulin 1995 JFQ 66. 
216 Ibid. 
217 See S/Res 872. See also S/Res 893 and S/Res 909. 
218
 See S/Res 872. 
219 See Carlsson Report, S/1999/1257 6. 
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The deterioration of the security situation in Rwanda could be attributed to the 
parties‟ failure to implement the accords.  However, various flaws were also 
found in the implementation of UNAMIR's mandate which could be summa-
rised as follows: 
First, Article 7 of the Agreement stipulated that the transitional institutions were 
to be set up within a period of thirty seven (37) days following the signing of 
the agreement.220 The fact that the Agreement stipulated such a short period 
could be interpreted that speed was a priority and ultimately the level of in-
depth analysis that underpins the success of such situations was compro-
mised from the start.221  Because of the haste required in deploying UNAMIR, 
an essential report compiled by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights which highlighted a possible genocide was never taken into 
consideration when the Council drafted UNAMIR's mandate.222 
Second, the number of troops provided did not mirror the realities on ground. 
The Reconnaissance mission, headed by Brigadier-General Romeo A Dal-
laire223 recommended that a force of up to 4 260 should be deployed but the 
actual mandate expressed plans to deploy only half that number.224  The rea-
son for this was that the Secretary-General believed that the deployment of 
4 260 troops would not be realistic and even if they attempted to gather such a 
number, they would be a considerable delay in rounding up such a large num-
ber of troops from the member states as the UN was already facing massive 
demands from Somalia and Bosnia.225 
                                                   
220 See Article 7 of the Peace Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Rwanda and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Withdrawal of the Rwandan Troops from the Territo-
ry of the DRC and the Dismantling of the EX-FAR and Interahamwe Forces in the DRC signed at Arusha 
on 4 August 1993. 
221 See Carlsson Report, S/1999/1257 31. 
222 Ibid. 
223
 See Carlsson Report, S/1999/1257 7.  Dallaire at this stage was Chief Military Observer of the Unit-
ed Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR). The objective of the Reconnaissance 
mission which Dallaire led was to assess the requirements of a peacekeeping mission if it were to be 
deployed to Rwanda. 
224
 Ibid. 
225 See Carlsson Report, S/1999/1257 7. 
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Third, strikingly absent in the mandate was UNAMIR's role in the recovery of 
arms.226  Even though the Secretary-General had made such a recommenda-
tion in S/26488, this element was never incorporated into the mandate.227   
Fourth, the UN‟s rigidity demonstrated by UNAMIR‟s failure to adapt to the re-
alities on ground.   The insistence of headquarters to maintain the 
peacekeeping operation as a traditional one showed a lack of flexibility on the 
part of the UN.  It is apparent from the text and context of UNAMIR‟s mandate 
that its primary objective was to act as an observer to the cease-fire agree-
ment. It follows that when imminent and necessary action was required outside 
the scope of its mandate, UNAMIR was considerably paralysed.  A telling illus-
tration of this flaw could be seen in the handling of the 11 January cable from 
Dallaire to Major-General Maurice Baril, Military Adviser to the Secretary-
General. This cable outlined information obtained from an informant of a "plan 
to exterminate the Tutsi's" and yet very little importance and urgency was at-
tached to it.228  
The Carlsson report highlights the following errors in the handling of the cable: 
a) The 11 January cable should have also been sent to other parties 
higher up in the hierarchy and not only to the Military Adviser to the 
Secretary-General.229 As a result, the Secretary-General and the Se-
curity Council continued to deliberate on the situation in Rwanda in 
the absence of such vital information.230 Also, the report stresses the 
fact that more pressure should have been applied on President 
Habyarimana to act once they informed him of the cable.231  
b) The 11 January cable detailed existence of a major weapons 
cache.232 Since UNAMIR's role in the recovery of arms caches was 
not explicit in its mandate the secretariat saw fit to instruct UNAMIR 
to refrain from raiding armed caches as it believed that such action 
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would be outside the scope of its mandate and would exacerbate the 
already volatile situation.233  Upon realising this significant limitation 
in the mandate, the Council should have taken measures to correct 
this.234 
c) The 11 January cable also highlighted threats against the Belgian 
contingent and a strategy that would force their withdrawal. This in-
formation should have received greater attention particularly when 
the security of the contingent was being considered and also during 
consultations within the secretariat and with the council.235  Regretful-
ly, the lack of follow up to such vital information resulted in the death 
of the Belgian soldiers and Belgian's withdrawal from the peacekeep-
ing operation.236  In this connection, the Carlsson report points out 
that had the initial threat received the importance it so warranted, the 
UN would have been able to consider the possibility that any with-
drawal would ultimately serve the extremists purpose in their 
propaganda.237 
Outside the issues surrounding the flaws of the mandate, several UN activities 
served as 'red flags' leading up to the genocide: 
First, the Rules of Engagement for UNAMIR were never transparent.  Even 
though Dallaire had submitted a draft to headquarters for approval on 23 No-
vember 1993, a formal reply was never received.238  There were apparently no 
clear procedures put in place at headquarters for formal replies.239  Once the 
genocide had began, Dallaire resent this draft which also included the rules of 
engagement relating to crimes against humanity and yet these rules were 
never adhered to even though "the situation on ground fit the description in pa-
ra 17".240 
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Second, weak communication lines existed between UNAMIR and headquar-
ters.  Many factors leading up to the genocide point to weak communication 
between headquarters and UNAMIR.  This is evident in the following scenari-
os: 
a) The handling of the 11 January cable illustrates the existence of weak 
communication between the peacekeeping operation and headquarters.  
The cable contained the following vital and pertinent information: 
 the existence of a plan to kill the Belgian soldiers that would lead to 
their ultimate withdrawal.241 
 the existence of training camps that had trained 1700 men who had 
apparently been ordered to kill Tutsi's.242 
 the existence of a major weapons cache.243 
In spite of this - as has already been mentioned above, the Secretary-
General and the Security Council continued to deliberate on the situation in 
Rwanda in the absence of such vital information. Undoubtedly, clear and 
timely communication on such matters would have entailed advanced stra-
tegic planning and better results. 
b) In addition, many cables were exchanged between headquarters and 
UNAMIR in the early months of 1994 from the ground in relation to "dis-
tribution of arms, the activities of the militia, killings and increased ethnic 
tensions".244  UNAMIR continued to appeal to headquarters for approval 
to begin deterrent operations and expressed the urgent necessity of 
such action.245  However, Annan continued to reiterate that such action 
was beyond the scope of UNAMIR and thus approval was never granted 
in this respect.246   
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Also, on "14 February 1994, the Belgian Minister wrote to the Secretary-
General advocating for a stronger UNAMIR and yet no serious attention was 
attached to his proposal within the Secretariat or among countries".247   
Another telling illustration of the UN's weak communication structure can also 
be seen in the 30 March (S/1994/360) progress report from UNAMIR to the 
Council.  This report detailed "political stalemate, the deterioration of the secu-
rity situation and the humanitarian situation in Rwanda".  In this, the Secretary-
General recommended an extension of UNAMIR's mandate by six months and 
yet resolution 909 (1994) on 5 April only extended it by less than four months 
due to the member states unwillingness to extend it for the proposed period.248  
Third, there was also the issue of genocide warnings that could have been de-
duced from the incitement of hatred that was spread by means of radio and 
press.  One such radio station was Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines 
(RTLM), which served as an effective tool to deepen the rift between the Hutus 
and Tutsi‟s.249 It is also believed that the reason that the Hutu‟s were able to 
annihilate such a large number of Tutsi‟s was because the radio stations were 
able to penetrate even the most remote areas with their hateful message – 
Hutu farmers were able to pick up arms and kill their Tutsi neighbours in spite 
of having peacefully co-existed in their areas.250  In effect, “Radio propaganda 
served the function of legitimizing the killing neighbour by neighbour”.251 The 
UN could have set up their own broadcasts to “counter” these panic and hate-
inducing messages but they did not do so.252 
4.4 UN activities during the genocide 
Arguably, the evidence of the genocide began to manifest in the early months 
of 1994. However, it could be safe to say that the beginning of the genocide 
was triggered by the deaths of President Juvenal Habyarimana and the Presi-
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dent of Burundi, Mr Cyprian Ntayamira in a plane crash on 6 April 1994.253  
The period following the crash, inaugurated genocidal actions against the Tutsi 
and moderate Hutu's. The Presidential Guard, elements of the Rwandan 
armed forces (FAR) and extremist militia (Interahamwe) immediately began 
the mass killings, starting in the capital Kigali.254 UNAMIR was inundated with 
calls from politicians and staff members requesting protection and refuge as 
news of "roadblocks being up, massacres of Tutsi and opposition and moder-
ate politicians began".255  
4.4.1 The massacre of prominent politicians and civilians 
According to the findings of the Carlsson report, substantial information had 
reached UNAMIR regarding threats to the safety and security of politicians and 
several prominent civil servants during the entirety of its mandate.256  In re-
sponse, added security measures were taken to ensure the safety of each 
threatened politician.  Some of the measures included assigning personal 
armed bodyguards and UNAMIR vehicle escorts and the said efforts were fur-
ther intensified after the plane crash.257 In spite of this, several flaws were 
found by the Inquiry in assessing UNAMIR's role in protecting the lives of 
threatened politicians. The following examples will illustrate this: 
Politician 1: Mrs Agathe Uwilingiyimana, Prime Minister.  Following the plane 
crash and the ensuing threats against ministers and other politicians, UNAMIR 
provided the Prime Minister with 10 Belgian soldiers at her residence to act as 
added security.258  Within hours of the crash, the Prime Minister‟s house was 
surrounded by 20 armed Rwandan soldiers who requested the Belgian sol-
diers to handover their weapons.259 Whilst this exchange went on, the Prime 
Minister managed to escape to the United Nations Volunteer (UNV) compound 
where she requested UN protection.  However, it was at this compound that 
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the Rwandan soldiers found and murdered the Prime Minister on 7 April 
1994.260 
Back at the Prime Minister‟s residence, the Belgian soldiers remained in con-
frontation with the Rwandan soldiers who asked them to "lay down their 
weapons".261  They eventually did so and were subsequently badly beaten and 
murdered.262 
Politician 2: Mr Landaold Ndasingwa, Vice President of the Liberal Party (PL) 
and Minister for Labour and Social Affairs.  The Inquiry found that Mr 
Ndasingwa had "been the subject of propaganda and threats on the Radio-
Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM)" and UNAMIR had accordingly pro-
vided protection during this period.263 In the few hours following the plane 
crash, word had reached Mr Ndasingwa that the Presidential Guards were on 
their way to kill him and the Ghanaian troops who had been charged with pro-
tecting the minister fled his residence.264 Consequently, Mr Ndasingwa, his 
wife, mother and two children were shot to death.265 
Politician 3: Constitutional Court Judge Kavaruganda.  Judge Kavaruganda 
was abducted from his home and his family beaten in spite of many urgent 
appeals to the Belgian, Bangladeshi and Ghanaian contingents of UNAMIR.266 
His abduction is believed to have happened under the watchful eye of UN-
AMIR guards.267  Moreover, the Inquiry also recounted a witness's version of 
events in which the witness stated that "UN troops stood talking to the Rwan-
dese soldiers with their weapons lying on the table beside them".268 
Politician 4: Mr Boniface Ngulinzira, Foreign Minister during the Arusha Nego-
tiations.  After having received news that Mr Ngulizira's life was in imminent 
danger, the UN soldiers transferred him and his family to the Ecole Technique 
Officielle (ETO) at Kicukiro, the site where as many as 2000 Rwandans had 
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taken refuge under the protection of the Belgian UNAMIR contingent.269  Re-
gretfully, on 11 April, the Inquiry reports that once the French troops had 
evacuated the expatriates and the Belgian troops had withdrawn from the site, 
a massacre ensued that killed men, women, children and Mr Ngulinzira.270   
The events that unfolded at the ETO school could be said to have epitomised 
the UN's failure in handling the Rwandan genocide.271  As mentioned above, 
the ETO school was a site that civilians had gone to as one of the places of 
refuge when the security situation had worsened in Rwanda.  The Belgian con-
tingent was also based at this site and therefore appeared to be a credible 
place to seek refuge for thousands of civilians that required protection.  After 
the plane crash and when it had become clear that the security situation in 
Rwanda had worsened, measures were taken by Belgium, France, Italy and 
the United States to evacuate expatriates from the Rwanda including those 
expatriates who sought refuge at the ETO school.272 As has already been 
pointed out above, the result of this evacuation and the withdrawal of the Bel-
gian contingent led to the loss of thousands of lives that were left behind. 
The United Human Rights Council reported the killings in Rwanda as follows: 
Tutsi and people suspected of being Tutsi were killed in their homes and as 
they tried to flee at roadblocks set up across the country during the genocide. 
Entire families were killed at a time. Women were systematically and brutally 
raped. It is estimated that some 200,000 people participated in the perpetra-
tion of the Rwandan genocide. In the weeks after April 6, 1994, 800,000 men, 
women, and children perished in the Rwandan genocide, perhaps as many as 
three quarters of the Tutsi population. At the same time, thousands of Hutu 
were murdered because they opposed the killing campaign and the forces di-
recting it.273 
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4.4.2 The genocide - UN failure or member states failure? 
The issues discussed above principally address some of UNAMIR's challeng-
es on the ground.  On the whole, one can say that a majority of the 
aforementioned challenges stemmed from the Council's inability to handle the 
situation promptly and effectively at headquarters.   Communication between 
the UN Secretariat and UNAMIR was also affected.  Since the UN Secretariat 
was under constant pressure to ensure another Somalia did not take place, 
the Secretariat was reluctant for UNAMIR to steer away from their mandate 
even though the realities on ground called for it.274  
As the key events of the genocide unfolded, the Council was faced with the 
following issues that ultimately defined the failure of the UN: 
I. Reduction of UNAMIR force level when there existed a pressing need 
for the opposite 
As echoed above, UNAMIR was set up as a traditional peacekeeping opera-
tion which primarily meant that UNAMIR would act as an observer to the 
ceasefire agreement.  When it became apparent that the cease fire agreement 
had collapsed and the security situation in Rwanda had severely deteriorated, 
member states began to discuss the possibilities of a withdrawal. According to 
the findings of the Inquiry, possibilities of withdrawal were discussed within a 
few days after the plane crash.275  For example, a cable sent on 9 April from 
the DPKO informed Dallaire and Booh Booh that since the situation in Rwanda 
had continued to deteriorate, the possibilities of a withdrawal may have to be 
considered.276  It also could be said that the possibility of withdrawal of UN-
AMIR became an even more probable option when the Belgium government 
lost 10 of their peacekeepers on ground.277   
As per practice, the issue of UNAMIR‟s withdrawal vs. its continued presence 
in Rwanda was brought before the Council.  The following member states 
were seen to have strongly played a role in the campaign for UNAMIR‟s with-
drawal: 
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Belgium 
The Inquiry found communication exchanged between Mr Willy Claes, Bel-
gium‟s Foreign Minister and the Secretary-General in which Mr Claes made 
clear the position of Belgium after the brutal murder of their peacekeepers.278 
Belgium was of the view that nothing further could be done in Rwanda and 
that the very presence of UNAMIR worsened the situation.279 Belgium had al-
so stated that "it preferred the withdrawal to be a collective effort of UNAMIR 
and would not like to withdraw alone and was prepared to leave its weapons 
and equipment behind if UNAMIR were to stay".280 Furthermore, after with-
drawing its contingent on 11 April, the Inquiry found minutes of a meeting held 
on 12 April in Bonn, in which Belgium was of the view that UNAMIR must sus-
pend its operations since as many as 20 000 people had been killed under its 
watchful eye.281   Moreover, the Inquiry found that the Belgian government had 
on several occasions after the 12 April meeting attempted to influence Council 
members of a complete withdrawal of UNAMIR.282 In turn, the Secretary-
General informed Belgium that he was of the opinion that a proposal to with-
draw UNAMIR would most likely be rejected.283  The Secretary-General 
updated the Council of this meeting and expressed the adverse effects that the 
withdrawal of the Belgian contingent would have on UNAMIR.284 
One could argue that after the murder of the 10 Belgium peacekeepers, the 
withdrawal of the rest of their contingent and the Belgian's subsequent "cam-
paign" to withdraw UNAMIR in its totality was somewhat warranted.  However, 
from a humanitarian standpoint, there can be no justifiable excuse to have left 
the plight of the Rwandans to the Rwandans.  The Inquiry's conclusion with 
regard to this issue shared this sentiment by stating that "the campaign to se-
cure the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR is difficult to understand."285  
Moreover, the Inquiry believed that "the analysis of the situation in Rwanda, 
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which was presented as an underlying argument for withdrawal, painted a pic-
ture of on-going massacres, in addition to the fighting between the parties. 
However, the focus seems to have been solely on withdrawal rather on the 
possibilities for the United Nations to act, with or without Belgium."286 
United States  
In many respects, the Council was largely divided on the issue of withdrawal. 
Apart from the Belgians, countries like the United States favoured UNAMIR's 
withdrawal more so because of the loss of American peacekeepers in Soma-
lia.287  The war in Somalia saw the loss of American and Pakistani 
peacekeepers.288 Within weeks of the genocide, President Clinton passed the 
Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD25).289 This directive principally set out 
the criteria to be met when deciding US involvement in international peace-
keeping missions.  The objective of PDD25 sought to ensure that US troops 
would only be deployed only if stringent requirements had been met.290   
The criteria set forth by the PDD25 for US troop deployment was as follows: 
 UN involvement advances US interests, and there is an international 
community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral ba-
sis.291  
 There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission 
fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace en-
forcement.292  
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 For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a ceasefire 
should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the 
force is deployed.293  
 For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to interna-
tional peace and security is considered significant.294  
 The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forc-
es, financing and mandate appropriate to the mission.295  
 The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by 
the international community have been weighed and are considered 
unacceptable.296  
 The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and real-
istic criteria for ending the operation.297  
If one undertakes a perusal of the above conditions, it becomes apparent that 
such criteria would be difficult to meet in any given conflict, particularly con-
flicts in Africa.  The reason for this criticism mainly stems from the high 
complexity of civil wars in Africa.  To set up additional criteria such as the ones 
in the PDD25 could be seen to undermine the very essence of peacekeeping.  
If all states were to each set up their own criteria for involvement instead of 
acting when called upon by the UN, states would find more cause for inaction 
than not.  For instance, the first criteria of the PDD25 stipulates that deploy-
ment of US troops to peacekeeping operations would be justified if "UN 
involvement advances US interests..” Adhering to such criteria would entail 
that states only provide troops for peacekeeping missions when it is of benefit 
to them.  Consequently, a state like Rwanda which supposedly failed to meet 
the criteria set above did not receive any American troops before or during the 
genocide.  
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On the whole, it would seem that directives such as PDD25 pose to undermine 
the advancement of principles such as "Responsibility to Protect".298  The US 
had the necessary information to act when the genocide happened but it 
chose not to.299  In addition to its disinclination to act, the US joined Belgium in 
its campaign to withdraw UNAMIR entirely from Rwanda.300 Even though the 
"shadow of Somalia" has been viewed as a reason why the US did not want to 
do more, many have argued that it was simply because the US had no nation-
al interests in Rwanda.301 It was after all, "... A country with no industry and few 
natural resources and has long been dependent on foreign development 
aid".302  
France 
France, on the other hand, was blamed for its supposed contribution to the 
genocide. Here, the issue with France was not related to the withdrawal of 
UNAMIR but rather its contribution to the genocide - it is believed that France 
played a role in supplying arms to the government of Rwanda.  A Human 
Rights Watch Arms project (January 1994) highlights that the French not only 
provided troops but also trained them in "tactical combat situations".303 France 
has however, maintained that its only role was to protect civilians during the 
genocide and that the allegations against it were a form of retaliation after a 
French judge found Paul Kigame responsible for president Habyarimana‟s 
plane crash - which was seen as the trigger of the genocide.304  
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Options available to UNAMIR during the genocide 
With the withdrawal of the biggest contingent in UNAMIR coupled with US and 
Belgium calling for the withdrawal of UNAMIR when the genocide happened, 
UNAMIR´s tasks on ground became increasingly difficult to undertake.305  By 
20 April, UNAMIR only had 1 515 troops left as opposed to the 2 165 troops 
available before the Belgian contingent withdrawal.306  Meanwhile, reports of 
widespread massacres and human rights violations continued to escalate 
throughout the country. 
In response, the Secretary-General appeared before the Council and present-
ed the various options available to UNAMIR as follows: 
1) A deployment of several thousand troops under Chapter VII of the Unit-
ed Nations Charter.  This was an option to be looked at in the event that 
the massacres continued and "there was no realistic prospect of the two 
sides agreeing on an effective cease-fire in the immediate future".307 
2) Reduce the military force level to 270 which would act as "intermediary 
between the two parties in an attempt to bring them to an agreement on 
a cease-fire" - this redefined mandate was to be in Rwanda for "two 
weeks or longer, should the Council prefer".308 
3) Complete withdrawal of UNAMIR, an option which was not supported 
by the Secretary-General.309 
The Council, under resolution 912 decided to proceed with the second option 
presented above.310  The elements of the revised mandate were as follows: 
(a)      To act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure 
their agreement to a cease-fire311 
(b)      To assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the ex-
tent feasible; and 312 
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(c)      To monitor and report on developments in Rwanda, including the safety 
and security of the civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR313 
Regrettably, with the presence of only 270 UNAMIR troops left in Rwanda, the 
decision taken under this resolution attributed to the loss of additional hun-
dreds of thousands of lives in the genocide.   
The continued role of the Council 
As has already been pointed out, the Council has been bestowed with the re-
sponsibility of maintaining international peace and security.  Also, the Council's 
decisions on substantive matters require concurring votes of the P5 and four 
votes from the non-permanent members (see 3.3.1). Furthermore, as con-
ferred by the Charter, any decision taken by the council is binding on all 
member states of the United Nations (see 3.3.1).  In essence, it could be said 
that the decisions that were brought before the Council with regard to UN-
AMIR's continued role in Rwanda were taken by member states. It is thus 
apparent that the decision taken under resolution 912 to reduce the troops to 
270 at a time when the Rwandans needed urgent assistance with restoring law 
and order and humanitarian relief could be attributed to member states.  The 
decision taken under this resolution to reduce UNAMIR‟s force level went 
ahead even though some member states strongly opposed it.314 For instance, 
the representative of Rwanda, a member of the Council at the time, made the 
following statement:  
The option chosen by the council, reducing the number of troops in UNAMIR 
to approximately 200, is not a proper response to this crisis, as no measures 
are envisaged to help those exposed to all kinds of peril as a result of the hos-
tilities.315 
France, a permanent member of the Council provided the following rationale 
with regard to reducing UNAMIR's force level to 270:  
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The United Nations gave the Rwandese parties several days to conclude a 
cease-fire, which would have allowed UNAMIR to carry out the mandate given 
to it by resolution 872 (1993).  Unfortunately, there is still no cease-fire, and 
the Security Council was therefore compelled to reconsider the conditions for 
UNAMIR's presence, reducing it to a minimal level.  We hope that the Rwan-
dese parties will come to their senses and realize that the United Nations can 
neither take their place nor impose peace on them.316   
With regard to the option of withdrawal, the Inquiry also found that on balance, 
the Council was unable to make an appropriate response to the genocide be-
cause the Council could not come to an agreement.317  For instance, even 
though the Secretary General on 29 April had called on the reversal of the de-
cision taken under resolution 912, it "took two weeks for the Council to agree 
on the matter".318  Also, the Council continued to be divided on the way for-
ward for UNAMIR.  Non-permanent members of the Council continued to rally 
for greater action which involved an increased strength of troops authorized to 
act under Chapter VII.319   However, the objections presented by permanent 
members such as the United States and the United Kingdom made it impossi-
ble to move forward as they required more details before they would concede 
to such an operation.320  From the viewpoint of countries such as the UK, 
since the US did not support an increased level force, they did not believe that 
such force would ever be deployed and thereby called for a withdrawal.321 In 
this regard, the Inquiry thus opined that "the delay in the decision making by 
the Security Council was a distressing show of lack of unity in a situation 
where rapid action was necessary".322 
The deployment of UNAMIR II and Operation Turquoise 
Eventually, on 17 May 1994, the Council, by adopting resolution 918 (1994), 
imposed an arms embargo against Rwanda, called for urgent international ac-
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tion and increased UNAMIR's strength to up to 5,500 troops.323 However, it 
took nearly six months for member states to provide the troops.324 
In an attempt to increase the safety and security of civilians, the Council, by 
resolution 929 authorized, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, a 
multi-national humanitarian operation in June 1994.325 This humanitarian pro-
tection zone was set up in the south-west of Rwanda by French-led 
multinational forces (Operation Turquoise) that remained in the zone up until 
August 1994 when UNAMIR was better equipped to take over the zone.326 
Even though Operation Turquoise helped save thousands of lives, the Inquiry 
found it “unfortunate that the resources committed by France and other coun-
tries to Operation Turquoise could not instead have been put at the disposal of 
UNAMIR II”.327 
The end of the genocide fell in July when the RPF forces took control of 
Rwanda, and established a broad-based Government for a transitional period 
of five years.328  
II. The failure to intervene and the inability to call the mass killings in 
Rwanda 'genocide'  
As echoed above, the warning signs of the genocide were clearly evident but 
little was done to respond to the genocide.   On balance, it would seem that 
the Council and DPKO had all the information necessary to act but they did 
not.  The 11 January cable sent by Dallaire for example, gave such warnings. 
Also, the analysis of human rights experts in 1993 had pointed to genocide 
along with statements made in early April by the RPF.329  Also, as was pointed 
above – the radio broadcasts from RTLM could have been seen as warnings 
of an impending genocide and yet nothing was done by the UN to counter 
such messages.  
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In addition to ignoring the warnings, it appears that the UN was reluctant to 
acknowledge that the massacres in Rwanda constituted genocide.  Why was 
there a reluctance to call the massacres genocide when all the signs pointed 
to its occurrence? Dr Hanton, a widely published author and specialist on gen-
ocide studies, answers this question by stating that had the member states 
admitted to the occurrence of genocide, such admittance would have placed a 
"moral duty to intervene".330  Dr Hanton further explains that instead of using 
the word genocide, US state department lawyers and policy makers preferred 
to use the term, "civil war" as it did not call for intervention.331 In this respect, 
Dr Hanton summarizes the failure of the UN as follows: 
a. The denial of the facts which pointed to an impending genocide.332   
b. The denial that the heinous acts committed in Rwanda constituted geno-
cide.333 
Similarly, the Inquiry found the reluctance to use the term "genocide" was un-
justifiable, pointing out that member states had an obligation to act under the 
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide.334 
Article 2 of the Genocide convention defines genocide as any of the following 
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
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It is important to note that once it has been proven that any of the acts stipu-
lated in article 2 have been committed, any contracting party to the Genocide 
Convention may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take 
such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appro-
priate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the 
other acts enumerated in article 3.335  On close scrutiny of article 2, it would 
appear that no legal obligation is placed on member states of the Council to 
act.  However, it would be suffice to say that there exists a moral duty to act 
under their role as upholders of international peace and security to prevent 
and stop the genocide as called upon by the Genocide Convention.  This con-
cept is further explained by the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention 
of Genocide as follows:  
The duty to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities lies first and fore-
most with the State, but the international community has a role that cannot be 
blocked by the invocation of sovereignty. Sovereignty no longer exclusively 
protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of responsibility where 
States are accountable for the welfare of their people.336  
With respect to the genocide in Rwanda, the Inquiry found that signs existed 
that confirmed the occurrence of genocide in Rwanda, including the "broad-
casting pictures of bloating corpses floating down the river from Rwanda" and 
yet member states still felt it unnecessary to use the term, "genocide".337   
Furthermore, the Inquiry also believed that even if the member states were 
under the impression that the acts committed did not constitute genocide, "the 
UN and member states must also be prepared to mobilise political will to act in 
the face of gross violations of human rights which have not reached the ulti-
mate level of genocide".338  
 Regretfully, the egregious denial of the genocide resulted in the UN's failure to 
take appropriate action and consequently led to the death of 800 000 Rwan-
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dans. Suffice to say, the UN did not end the genocide in Rwanda. The geno-
cide came to an end shortly after the RPF took over Kigali in July 1994 (see 
above).   
III. Inability and lack of political will to respond to the needs (logistical 
support, resources and troops) with the necessary speed and urgency 
required  
As has been apparent throughout this chapter, lack of logistical support, re-
sources and troops were huge challenges for the UN.  Clearly, such factors 
played a fundamental role in the failure of the UN to prevent and stop the gen-
ocide in Rwanda.  As the events of the genocide unfolded it also became very 
clear that many of UNAMIR's weaknesses stemmed from these issues. In this 
regard, the Inquiry highlighted the various flaws as follows: 
a. Available troops did not have the necessary training.339 
b. Available troops such as the Bangladeshi contingent did not have the most 
basic supplies.340 
c. Strong contingents such as the Belgian contingent had issues with recycled 
material and lack of arms.341 
d. Contingents did not bring with them necessary reserves such as water, fuel, 
food rations from their respective countries.342 
e. Low standards available at the medical unit.343 
f. Inadequate number of military observers.344 
g. Inadequate arms and ammunition.345 
The Inquiry‟s findings attributed the above issues to the DPKO, troop contrib-
uting countries and the Security Council.346  From its inception, UNAMIR was 
weak as it was deployed during a period when many other peacekeeping 
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troops were needed or deployed in other parts of the world.347  By March of 
1994, it is believed that the UN had "over USD1 billion in outstanding assess-
ments to peacekeeping operations".348  As a result, UNAMIR received 
"constant pressure to save money and cut resources".349 Also, as has already 
been pointed out, the shadow of Somalia also caused countries like the US to 
be hesitant about spending on UNAMIR, let alone contribute any of their 
troops. Moreover, as was also pointed out, even after it became clear it was a 
genocide and it was decided that 5 500 troops would be deployed under UN-
AMIR II, it took 6 months before member states made this contribution - a time 
when the genocide had already come to an end. 
The factors discussed in this chapter have principally outlined what went 
wrong and why it went wrong.  The inaction of the member states, in particular 
the P5, was not necessarily caused by vetoes but rather the failure in making 
decisions that all five could agree on.  In effect, for every week that the Council 
failed to come to a decision, roughly 56 000 lives were lost.  Whether the UN 
and/or international community have learnt from this experience is an issue 
that will be explored in the last chapter of this paper. 
In moving forward, the events surrounding the civil war in Sudan will be dis-
cussed in the following chapter.  The chapter will attempt to draw on any 
similarities and differences of UN action in Sudan and the Rwandan genocide.   
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5 CHAPTER V THE UN IN SUDAN: LESSONS LEARNT ON THE PRE-
VENTION OF ARMED CONFLICT 
5.1 Revisiting the north-south conflict and the crisis in Darfur 
A brief sketch of the civil war in Sudan was discussed in 1.1.2 above. It would 
however be fallacious to hold the view that the civil war in Sudan is anything 
but complex.  It must be stressed from the outset that in order to understand 
the civil war in Sudan, it would prove useful to divide the north-south conflict 
into the different periods it occurred and treat the crisis in Darfur as a separate 
issue. 
5.1.1 North-South Conflict 
As stated in 1.1.2 above, Sudan has not only experienced the longest civil war 
in history but arguably one of the most brutal civil wars in history.  The war be-
tween the north and south of Sudan took place over two periods; the first one 
lasted from 1955 to 1972 and the second one from 1983 to 2005.350  Since the 
second war was simply a continuation of the first war, the latest war will be 
discussed in greater depth. 
As was the case with Rwanda, the root causes of the civil war in Sudan could 
be dated back to the colonial era.  Sudan gained its independence in 1956 af-
ter being colonised by Egypt and the United Kingdom.351  Under 
Egyptian/British rule, these colonialists helped deepen the cultural and reli-
gious differences between the ethnic tribes of the north and south.352  The 
north was primarily made up of Arabic descendants who practised Islam and 
the south was made of tribes that were considered African and practised 
Christianity and Animism.353 The tribes in the north were favoured by the colo-
nialists and thus enjoyed better access to economic and social progression.354 
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After independence, the north continued to discriminate and dominate the 
tribes in the south which “fostered insecurity and resentment in the south” and 
eventually led to the 1955-1972 civil war between the government and the 
Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement (SSLM).355  After years of negotia-
tion, the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed in 1972.  The Agreement‟s 
objective was to address the frustrations of the south through the provision of 
limited autonomy in the south and ascertaining the conditions necessary for 
“resource and power-sharing between the regions”.356  Even though this 
agreement managed to appease some of the frustrations of the south for 
about 10 years, the second war broke out in 1983 due to the abrogation of the 
agreement by the government of Sudan. The parties to the second war were 
the government of Sudan and the Sudan People‟s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A).  The government of Sudan undermined the signing of the agree-
ment by retracting autonomy of the south; enforcing Sharia law and Arabic as 
the official language in the whole of Sudan; and “changed the administrative 
borders so that the north could control oil resources”.357 It had now become 
evident that the two parties did not only dispute over the role of religion and 
autonomy of the south but also the country‟s resources, in particular, petrole-
um. 
The second war resulted in the death of over two million people; four million 
displaced civilians and about 600,000 refugees.358 Several initiatives were un-
dertaken to facilitate the peace process.  These initiatives were initially 
undertaken by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and 
later included the United Nations.  Their efforts, coupled with neighbouring 
states assistance and international pressure facilitated the signing of the 
Machakos Protocol in 2002.  The Machakos Protocol set up a “broad frame-
work, setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process and 
the structures of government, as well as on the right to self-determination for 
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the people of South Sudan, and on state and religion.”359 In effect, the Protocol 
provided the people of the south with the right to self-determination inter alia, 
through a referendum to determine whether the south would vote for seces-
sion or adopt the system of the government under the Peace Agreement.360  
This referendum was to be held after an interim period of six years.361 Another 
significant aspect of the Protocol was the freedom of religion provision which 
guaranteed that the people of Sudan had the right to practice any religion or 
custom and that Sharia law would not be imposed in the south.362 
 
However, since the two parties were unable to come to full agreement on cer-
tain issues363 pertinent to a cease-fire, the government and the SPLM 
continued to be engaged in negotiations and signed additional agreements to 
come to a consensus on all issues.364 
 
The Council in full recognisance of the fragile situation that existed in Sudan 
acted under Chapter VII of the Charter and dispatched a special political mis-
sion to Sudan, the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS).365 
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By 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed (see 1.1.2 
above) which officially marked the end of the war. Through this agreement, UN 
resolution 1590 was passed and the subsequent deployment of United Nations 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established (see 1.1.2).  As has also already 
been pointed out in 1.1.2, UNMIS primary objective was to facilitate the signing 
of the CPA. Also, UNMIS was to take over from UNAMIS.  Even though the 
CPA managed to address the outstanding issues from the Machakos Protocol, 
the cease-fire broke down when the Mr John Garang366 was killed in a helicop-
ter accident six months after signing the CPA.367 Therefore, even though the 
CPA had officially marked the end of the civil war, the death of Mr Garang is 
believed to have exacerbated the already highly volatile relations between the 
two parties and resulted in continued instability in Sudan.  Furthermore, sever-
al provisions of the CPA remained unaddressed and have also helped fuel the 
distrust between the government and the various rebel groups.  
5.1.2 The Crisis in Darfur 
Like other areas of Sudan, Darfur, a region in the west of Sudan, had experi-
enced severe conflict due to “ethnic, economic and political tensions and 
competition over scarce resources”.368 Violent clashes between the govern-
ment‟s allied Arab militia (the Janjaweed), the SLM/A and the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) continued to increase in their intensity and con-
sistency by February 2003.   
As has already been mentioned above, the UN responded to this by adopting 
resolution 1564 in which an International Commission of Inquiry was appointed 
in order to immediately investigate reports of violations of international humani-
tarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also 
whether or not acts of genocide had occurred and to identify the perpetrators 
of such violations with a view of ensuring that those responsible are held ac-
countable. In February of 2005, the said commission reported that even 
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though the crisis in Darfur did not constitute genocide, the government of Su-
dan and allied Janjaweed militias had carried out “indiscriminate attacks, 
including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of 
villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced dis-
placement.”369 The commission also “strongly recommended that the Security 
Council immediately refer to the International Criminal Court the situation of 
Darfur and the crimes perpetrated there since the beginning of the internal 
armed conflict.370 
5.1.2.1 The African Union In Darfur 
The African Union (AU) had long been engaged in facilitating peace and secu-
rity in Sudan, particularly in Darfur (see 1.1.2).  The decision to do so was 
taken under Article 4 of the Constitutive Act in which the AU has the right of the 
Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in 
respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity.371 Consequently, the AU exercised their efforts to facilitate 
peace talks between the parties to the conflict.  In April 2004, a Humanitarian 
Ceasefire Agreement was signed between the SLM/A, JEM and the govern-
ment of Sudan.  In turn, by October 2004, the AU Peace and Security Council 
authorised the deployment of African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to Darfur 
with the objective of calming the area.372  
Fundamentally, AMIS mandate was: 
a) to monitor and observe compliance with the ceasefire agreement373 
b)  to assist in confidence building measures374 
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c) to contribute to a secure environment by facilitating humanitarian assis-
tance and returns of internally displaced persons375 
d) and to contribute to overall security376 
The AU‟s efforts resulted in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
between the government of Sudan and the SLM/A in May 2005 (see 1.1.2).377 
Regrettably, the signing of this agreement did not end the violence in Darfur.  It 
has been suggested that one of the reasons for this was the agreement‟s fail-
ure to include all parties to the conflict in specific, the JEM and another faction 
of the SLA.378 The Janjaweed militias were also not party to the agreement.379  
Dr Sarjoh Bah, a widely published author and specialist in regional security 
cooperation in Africa further outlines the weaknesses of the DPA as follows: 
The DPA was further undermined by divisions among the armed groups along 
ethnic lines, pitting the Zaghawa against other most notably, the Fur, the larg-
est ethnic group in Darfur.  This rift led to increased friction among the armed 
groups and their civilians sympathisers in the internally displaced persons 
camps and it indeed continues to hinder efforts to reach a political settle-
ment.380 
Also, the DPA did not address pertinent issues such as “land tenure and the 
powers and structure of the local government”.381 
Initially, AMIS consisted of 150 troops but later increased its force to 7,000 by 
2005 in order to fulfil its mandate.382   In spite of such an increase and the „re-
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peated extension of AMIS‟ mandate throughout 2006, the violence in Darfur 
continued to escalate.383  
The Weaknesses of AMIS 
While the DPA could be said to have contained many inherent weaknesses, it 
also became apparent that AMIS was not able to calm the security situation in 
Darfur.  If anything, the security situation appeared to have continued to wors-
en.   
The following could be considered the reasons why AMIS failed to effectively 
contain the violence in Darfur: 
1. In view of the countless reports of violations of international humanitarian 
law and human rights law, AMIS mandate should have made the protection 
of civilian lives its number one priority; instead its mandate appeared to pri-
oritise “monitoring the terms of the ceasefire agreement between Khartoum 
and the rebel factions and protecting themselves and those monitoring the 
ceasefire agreement”.384  Some have argued that a less restricted mandate 
and a larger force level would have helped deter attacks against civilians 
and also enabled AMIS troops to protect themselves against rebels and mi-
litia.385 
2. The government of Sudan has often acted in bad faith and undermined the 
peace process.386 A telling illustration of this could be seen when the gov-
ernment “gave false information on crucial matters; continued using the 
Janjaweed to unleash mayhem on innocent civilians; delayed, clocked or 
rationed visas and permits for NGOs and private individual‟s access into 
Darfur”.387 
3. Discord among the many rebel groups also undermined the peace process. 
AMIS not only had to deal with the government of Sudan‟s role in intensify-
ing the conflict but also with the rebel group‟s contribution. The issue in 
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Sudan was that main rebel groups such as SLM/A and the JEM gave birth 
to smaller rebel groups due to “internal squabbles”.388 In turn, it became in-
creasingly difficult for AMIS to perform its functions as “the lack of a 
cohesive leadership created an opportunity for lawlessness and opportun-
istic ventures.”389 
4. AMIS was initially deployed with as little as “35 people on ground, three 
vehicles, USD5000 and twelve troops” even though the realities on ground 
called for a larger and greater force.390 This deficiency coupled with AMIS 
inadequate funds and resources placed insurmountable obstacles for the 
proper discharge of AMIS‟ duties on ground.391 
5.1.2.2 The UN in Darfur 
Once it became clear that the AU on its own could not contain the violence in 
Darfur, the proposal to merge AMIS efforts with a UN peacekeeping force be-
came increasingly necessary. In response, the Council adopted resolution 
1706 in August of 2006 in which it expanded UNMIS‟ mandate to also include 
Darfur (see 1.1.2).392  It was envisioned that this joint peacekeeping operation 
would primarily support the implementation of the DPA and its deployment 
would be subject to the consent of the Sudanese government (see 1.1.2).  The 
government of Sudan strongly opposed the hybrid mission based on the no-
tion that such a deployment was part of a “neo-colonial agenda.”393 
Furthermore, the government stated that they would withhold their consent un-
less the peacekeeping force had an “African character”.394  
In adopting 1706, it is significant to note that even though 12 members of the 
Council favoured the resolution, two of the P5 (China and Russia) abstained 
from voting.  It is believed that had these two states joined other members of 
the Council in the condemnation of the government of Sudan, such action 
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would have put their respective trade deals (oil and armaments) with Sudan in 
jeopardy.395    
Since consent from the government of Sudan was not forthcoming, the Coun-
cil began to deliberate on invoking the concept of “Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P). This concept embodies the following principles: 
1. The State carries the primary responsibility for the protection of popula-
tions from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing.396  
2. The international community has a responsibility to assist States in ful-
filling this responsibility.397  
3. The international community should use appropriate diplomatic, human-
itarian and other peaceful means to protect populations from these 
crimes. If a State fails to protect its populations or is in fact the perpetra-
tor of crimes, the international community must be prepared to take 
stronger measures, including the collective use of force through the UN 
Security Council.398 
Even though the crisis in Darfur called for the application of this concept, some 
argued that the core peacekeeping principle of consent could not be ignored.  
In this respect, Dr Bah pointed out that “debates about the appropriateness of 
invoking the concept meant that R2P was subject to varied interpretation, ex-
posing the tensions surrounding intervention even where its pre-conditions are 
met”.399 
The Council in April of 2007 adopted resolution 1755 in which it reaffirmed 
paragraphs 138-139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (R2P); 
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resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians; and resolution 1325 on women, 
peace and conflict.400   
After a diplomatic inertia, the Sudanese government consented to the deploy-
ment of a predominantly African hybrid force in June 2007.401  Accordingly, the 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted resolution 1769 in 
which the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) 
was deployed with an authorised force of 19 555 troops.402  
 UNAMID‟s core mandate as outlined on its official website 
(http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10998&language=en-US 
Date of Use 20 September 2012) as follows:  
 Protection of civilians  
 Contributing to security for humanitarian assistance  
 Monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements  
 Assisting an inclusive political process  
 Contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law 
Despite the efforts made by the Council with such a deployment, UNAMID ex-
perienced problems with shortage of staff and lost seven (7) peacekeepers in 
July 2008.403  
Furthermore, even with its presence on ground the violence against civilians 
did not appear to subside. As was already pointed out in 1.1.2, by 2010, at 
least sixty five (65) civilians had been killed and more than eighty six (86) 
wounded in attacks in the north and west of Darfur on 2 and 3 September 
2010.   UNAMID was accused of not fully protecting the civilian population of 
Darfur, which is the very core of its mandate (see 1.1.2). In addition, UN offi-
cials were criticised for “allowing those responsible for the vast human 
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catastrophe in Darfur to decide what the UN says to the world about the pre-
sent nature of the catastrophe” (see 1.12). 
As at September 2012, UNAMID consisted of a force level of 16 326 troops.404  
In spite of being the largest peacekeeping mission in the world, UNAMID has 
never been able to reach the envisioned strength of 19 555 troops since its 
deployment.405 
Also, UNAMID has suffered tremendous losses with respect to staff fatalities. 
As at September 2012, a total of 125 UNAMID personnel have been killed.406 
In spite of the significant losses the UN had suffered in Sudan, it could be said 
that the most progressive action it has taken was the referral of the Darfur Cri-
sis to the International Criminal Court through the adoption of resolution 
1593.407  Under resolution 1593, the ICC has jurisdiction over international 
crimes committed in Darfur, even though Sudan is not a party to the court.408 
Consequently, by March 2009, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Sudan‟s 
President, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir in which he has been charged for 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and later in July 2010 for the crime of 
genocide.409  Even though President Al Bashir has yet to be arrested and 
states like China and other African countries continue to foster good relations 
with him, it could be said that this indictment helps underscore the existence of 
an accountability mechanism – a legal guarantee that those who violate inter-
national law will be brought to justice when their own national authorities are 
unable or unwilling to do so. 
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5.2 The complex internal dynamics of Sudan 
It seems unquestionable that the peacekeeping operations in Sudan and Dar-
fur operate in one of the most hostile and complex security environments on 
the continent.  The success of these missions does not only depend on the 
number of troops and resources available to them but also the environment in 
which they operate in and the willingness of parties to a cease-fire agreement 
to fulfil the terms of the agreement. 
Accordingly, the following challenges can be identified: 
5.2.1 Addressing the grievances of splintered rebel groups 
In spite of signing numerous peace accords and deploying three UN peace-
keeping operations to Sudan, the case of Sudan remains a highly complex 
one.  Most of the peace agreements signed have either failed to address all 
grievances or failed to include all rebel groups during the negotiation process.   
As was echoed above, in recent times, the main rebel groups have splintered 
and borne new factions. Examples of some of these factions include: Sudan 
Liberation Army-Abdul Walid Faction (SLA-AW), Sudan Liberation Army-Minni 
Minnawi (SLA-MM), Sudan Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), Sudan 
Revolutionary Front (SRF).410  The new factions with their individual grievanc-
es and wants have instigated new cycles of violence which have further 
complicated the environments in which humanitarian organizations and UN 
peacekeepers operate in Sudan.411   
Also, these additional grievances and wants have made it increasingly difficult 
to near a political settlement with the government.  In this respect, it is likely 
that the region will continue to face instability until a larger part of the popula-
tion and its rebel groups‟ grievances have been addressed.   
                                                   
410 See Civil-Military Fusion Centre “Special Report: Sudan’s Southern Rebellion: The Two Areas”. 
Available at 
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5.2.2 The issue of South Kordofan state and Blue Nile state 
As has been already pointed out above, the north-south conflict came to an 
end in 2005 and subsequently followed by the south opting for secession in 
2011 which enabled them to become an independent state.412  However, it 
would be fallacious to hold the view that this secession contained the violence 
in both Sudan and South Sudan.  The two continue to have disputes with re-
gard to the unresolved issues in the CPA. One of the biggest sources of 
contention includes the issue surrounding the two states, South Kordofan and 
Blue Nile.  South Kordofan‟s main grievances stem from the North-South war 
in which it mainly suffered from “unfair representation in government and the 
loss of land rights to Arab tribes”.413 The Blue Nile state also felt marginalised 
due to Khartoum‟s lack of investment in the region. For instance, when the 
Roseires Dam was built, the people of the Blue Nile state not only suffered be-
cause of the massive displacement that followed but also because most of the 
benefits derived from the dam project were seldom shared with them.414  Pri-
marily, both states felt that they were victims of marginalisation and injustice. 
Chapter V of the CPA thus provided that the South Kordofan and Blue Nile 
states had the right to conduct popular consultations to address any shortcom-
ings of the CPA with regard to their states and use these consultations to 
decide what their relationship would be with Khartoum.415 The CPA in this re-
spect created some optimism in bringing about an end to the grievances of the 
two states. However, the popular consultations were never held. By Septem-
ber 2011, the International Crisis published a Conflict Risk Alert in which it 
stated that “the promised popular consultations were repeatedly delayed, and 
even when they started in Blue Nile state on September 2010, SPLM support-
ers and leadership lost confidence that their demand, namely the right to self-
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rule, would be met by Khartoum”.416 This growing distrust between the rebels 
and the government intensified and led to attacks on each other; each side at-
tempting to take control of the disputed states.417  As soon as this new wave of 
conflict began in September of 2011, the main rebel group in the southern re-
gion of Sudan, SPLM-N has since been banned by the government.418  The 
banning of the SPLM-N has done little, or nothing to contain the violence in the 
two states.  For instance, reports in June 2012 stated that “there had been 
more than 1 000 confirmed aerial bombings by MiG fighter jets and Antonoy 
war planes which had displaced half a million of civilians.”419  Also reports of 
“severe human rights violations such as mass arrests of Nuba civilians, arbi-
trary executions and several cases of rape and sexual violence against 
women and girls by Khartoum-backed militias” are believed to have occurred 
in South Kordofan.420The Blue Nile state is also believed to have experienced 
similar attacks and human rights violations. 
The fighting between the two states has resulted in a humanitarian crisis in 
which 240 000 people have fled the two states and taken refuge in the South 
and neighbouring, Ethiopia; a total of 665 000 civilians remain internally dis-
placed in the South Kordofon and Blue Nile states.421  Also, hundreds of 
thousands have fled the hostilities in the North and taken refuge in camps in 
the South. The on-going conflict in the two states and violence in the north 
have thus continued to overburden the South with refugees. 
In addition to the above complex internal dynamics, the following issues re-
main unresolved: “the referendum on the status of the Abyei area required by 
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the CPA, border demarcation, agreements on wealth-sharing arrangements 
and citizenship issues.”422 
5.3 UN Peacekeeping Challenges in Sudan 
The above factors demonstrate how complex dimensions of a conflict can un-
dermine a peacekeeping operation. However, some weaknesses are also 
evident in the UN‟s handling of the crisis in Sudan: 
a) The issue of inadequate troops and resources 
Experience has shown that getting UN peacekeeping operations to reach their 
envisioned capacities is not an easy feat.  UNAMID, however, came with the 
hope that troops would be deployed at a much faster rate since troops would 
be sourced from both the AU and the UN.  This was not the case.  As was 
mentioned above, UNAMID in spite of being the largest peacekeeping opera-
tion in the world has never reached its fullest capacity.  This inadequacy of 
troops was further complicated by the Sudanese government insistence that 
all the troops must come from African nations.  Also, once deployed, peace-
keepers in Sudan have often been victims to abductions, carjacking‟s, 
detentions and in some cases, death have been reported.423 These attacks 
have made it difficult for the peacekeepers to fulfil their obligations and duties.  
In addition to this, logistical constraints also play a role in obstructing the 
peace process. For instance, by 2008, “the U.N. and AU negotiation teams 
made a worldwide appeal for 24 helicopters, including six attack helicopters 
but “not one helicopter capable of operating in Darfur has been found”.424 Such 
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b) Two of the P5 (China and Russia) have demonstrated reluctance to 
take a stronger stand against Sudan 
3.3.3 above, illustrates the cases where China and Russia have abstained 
from voting in order to prevent the Council from adopting a resolution that was 
aimed at taking tougher measures against Sudan.  It is believed that the rea-
son for the abstention lies with the strong economic ties that the aforemen-
aforementioned countries have with Sudan.  The following economic ties have 
been found between Sudan and the two super powers: 
a) China owns 40% interest in Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company 
(GNPOC) that operates the pipeline425 
b) Oil extracted in South Sudan accounts for 5% of China‟s demand426 
c) Both Russia and China have exported to Sudan ammunition, helicopter 
gunships, attack aircrafts, air-to-ground rockets and armoured vehicles.427 
Amnesty International (AI) confirms the aforementioned arms deals through 
the following accounts: 
o AI‟s discovery of 2010-manufactured ammunition with Chinese 
manufacturing codes observed in South Kordofan during 2011.428 
o The aerial attacks in eastern Darfur on both military and civilians 
during 2011 used Mi-24 helicopter gunships and Antonov aircraft 
provided by Russia; AI has confirmed that Sudan received 36 new 
Mi-24 helicopter gunships between 2007 and 2009.429 
o AI also confirms the use of both BTR-80A armoured vehicles and 
multiple rocket launchers in eastern Darfur in 2011; this confirms im-
portation from Russia and Belarus of the aforementioned 
armament.430 
                                                   
425 See Wuoi 2012-01-07 Sudan Tribune.  Available at http://www.sudantribune.com/China-s-role-in-
North-South,41210 (Date of Use: 25 September 2012). 
426 Ibid. 
427
 See Amnesty International “Sudan: No end to Violence in Darfur” Available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR54/007/2012/en/c1037da2-0f54-4343-8325-





- 89 - 
It is apparent that the aforementioned arms deals between Russia, China and 
Sudan have taken place even after placing arms embargoes on Sudan by the 
UN Security Council.  For instance, the Council, through the adoption of reso-
lution1556 on 30 July 2004, imposed sanctions in relation to the Sudan in 
response to the on-going humanitarian crisis and widespread human rights 
violations, including continued attacks on civilians.431 Additionally, the Council 
adopted resolution 1591, which expanded the scope of the arms embargo and 
imposed additional measures including a travel ban and an assets freeze on 
individuals designated by the UNSC Committee established pursuant to reso-
lution 1591.432 By 2010, the enforcement of the arms embargo was reinforced 
by resolution 1945.433 
Clearly, Russia and China are fully cognisant of their actions and how their ac-
tions fuel the hostilities in Sudan.  In addition to supplying arms, China 
continues to foster good relations with Sudan‟s President, Al Bashir.   
The conspicuous role that these two states have taken on the issue of Sudan 
is one that cannot be ignored.  Brian Wood, an expert on Military and Policing 
for AI succinctly stated: 
China and Russia are selling arms to the Government of Sudan in the full 
knowledge that many of them are likely to end up being used to commit hu-
man rights violations in Darfur.  The Darfur conflict is sustained by the constant 
flow of weapons abroad. To help prevent further serious violations of human 
rights, all international arms transfers to Sudan should be immediately sus-
pended and the UN arms embargo extended to the whole country.434 
On balance, it would appear that as long as both Russia and China continue to 
benefit from the crises in Sudan, very little will be achieved in implementing 
peacekeeping efforts. In effect, the Council again faces the challenge of hav-
ing permanent members put their own national interests before the principle of 
maintaining international peace and security. 
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Because of this, “the Khartoum government thus finds itself in a position to dic-
tate terms of AU and UN engagement in the country without fear of major 
sanctions, as it could count on the support of veto-wielding allies in the UN 
Security Council.”435  
5.4 The additional complication of Al Bashir’s ICC Indictment 
The issued warrant of arrest for President Al Bashir was briefly mentioned in 
5.1.2.2 above.  As was also mentioned above, this warrant of arrest was is-
sued following the referral of the Darfur crisis to the ICC and the subsequent 
investigation undertaken by the Prosecutor‟s office of the ICC. Notably, Presi-
dent Al Bashir is the first sitting head of state to be indicted by the ICC and the 
first person to be indicted by the court for genocide by the court.436 Al Bashir‟s 
warrant of arrest includes the following charges: 5 counts on crimes against 
humanity; 2 counts on war crimes and 3 counts on genocide.437 
In spite of the apparent headway such an arrest warrant represented to the 
field of international law, this decision of the ICC has been met with significant 
controversy. The critics - the AU, Arab League, human rights groups, several 
African states as well as China have presented two main arguments:438 
First, the issuance of Al Bashir‟s arrest warrant has been seen as exacerbating 
the already fragile conditions in Sudan. Al Bashir‟s indictment has been seen 
as “slowing peace negotiations, hampering the work of aid agencies, and en-
dangering lives.”439  
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Second, the indictment has been viewed as an encroachment on the sover-
eignty of Sudan.440 Moreover, organisations such as the AU opposed the 
indictment because they felt that the ICC‟s sole purpose was to investigate on-
ly situations pertaining to Africa.441 In this regard, AU Chairman stated that “It 
seems that Africa has become a laboratory to test the new international 
law."442  
 
Third, the AU opined that Al Bashir should be immune pursuant to Article 98 
(1) of the Rome Statute which provides:  
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which 
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations un-
der international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a 
person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the coop-
eration of that third State for the waiver of the immunity. 
 
However, it should be noted that Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute by contrast 
provides: Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the offi-
cial capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not 
bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.  
 
Fuelled by its opposition to the indictment, the AU Peace and Security Council 
attempted to reverse the ICC decision by calling on the UN Security Council to 
delay President‟s Al Bashir indictment for a year.443 The delay was never 
granted and as a response, the AU called on its member states in 2009, 2010, 
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2011 and 2012 to not arrest and surrender President Al Bashir.444 Accordingly, 
some African states such as Kenya, Malawi, Egypt, Libya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Djibouti and Chad have welcomed Al Bashir even with his ICC indictment.445 
 
Despite the criticism and pressure from the AU, ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno-
Ocampo contended that “the conflict between justice and peace is a false di-
chotomy and that there is can be no political compromise on legality and 
accountability”.446  Consequently, the indictment of President Al Bashir still 
stands even though it has ostensibly has had little effect on his movements 
within Africa and the Middle East. 
 
Based on the discussion in this chapter, it would appear that the UN‟s handling 
of Sudan is similar to Rwanda primarily in the sense that troop and resource 
contribution continues to be an inherent weakness.  Experience has shown 
that the mere fact that member states agree to deploy a peacekeeping force 
has not necessarily translated into the immediate deployment of troops. It has 
also become increasingly clear that troop contributing countries take too long 
to respond, often at the expense of civilian‟s lives. 
Another similarity with Rwanda is the P5‟s ability to act as saboteurs of the 
peace process. With Rwanda, the issue was that the P5 had no national inter-
ests in Rwanda and thus opted not to take action when called to do so. With 
Sudan, strong economic ties exist with China and Russia. As echoed above, 
these ties have been viewed as the reason why more robust action has not 
been taken against Sudan. 
That said, in order to increase the overall effectiveness of peacekeeping ef-
forts, it would seem imperative that the UN find ways of dealing with the lack of 
political will of member states, particularly the P5 .  Increased political will of 
member states would help curb the financial and logistical constraints of 
peacekeeping and enable peacekeeping operations to be deployed in a more 
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rapid and effective manner.  Also, increased political would ideally entail that 
member states, particularly the P5 would place the needs of the peacekeeping 
missions above their own national interests. 
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6 CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 
6.1 Have lessons been learnt? 
As chapter 5 demonstrated, many mistakes were made in the handling of the 
Rwandan genocide.  The numerous reports and extensive studies conducted 
in Rwanda’s aftermath, all point to the need to not let another Rwanda happen 
again. Prominent figures such as Former US President Bill Clinton and Kofi 
Anan have admitted to mistakes made and vowed to exercise their efforts to 
prevent another Rwanda from happening again. 
Fundamentally, it could be said that the biggest “sins” committed in the han-
dling of the Rwandan genocide were as follows: 
a) The unwillingness of member states, particularly the P5, to act 
b) The unilateral decision of some governments to withdraw their contin-
gents from UNAMIR and subsequent reduction of UNAMIR‟s strength  
c) The inability to call the massacres in Rwanda a genocide 
d) Slow deployment of troops. Even once deployed, troops were poorly 
equipped and not properly trained 
e) Poor communication between the different chains of command within 
the mission and the Council 
f) Weak mandate and unclear rules of engagement 
Some of these “sins” have occurred yet again in the case of Sudan while oth-
ers do not appear to be significant factors.  In addition to the above, new 
issues have also arisen which predominantly stem from the complex internal 
dynamics of Sudan.  
Based on discussions in chapter 6, it would seem that some of the issues 
above have been repeated in Sudan in some shape or form. Below is a dis-
cussion that will attempt to determine the extent that the said issues pose 
obstacles to the peace process in Sudan. 
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With regard to (a), the Council has been accused of not taking more robust ac-
tion against the Sudanese government.  As has already been pointed out in 
chapter 5, the inability to do so was mainly caused by two of the P5, Russia 
and China. 
With regard to (b), no evidence has shown that troop contributing governments 
have unilaterally withdrawn their troops from Sudan.  However, a recent reso-
lution adopted on 31 July 2012 (S/Res/2063) has determined that the 
envisioned force level of 19 555 troops will now be reduced to 16 200 over the 
next 12 to 18 months.447  This reduction was decided after conducting a con-
flict assessment in Darfur.448  The review recommended that “UNAMID 
uniformed personnel need to be reconfigured to focus on the areas in Darfur 
with the highest security threats, with military focusing on areas of armed con-
flict and the provision of area security, while the police would concentrate on 
threats of criminality in high IDP concentration areas and capacity building to 
support returns.”449  The review also found an overlap in the use of military es-
corts and formed police units and that a more precise tasking of police and 
military personnel could achieve greater efficiencies in their use.450  It could 
thus be said that, the reduction in the case of Darfur, is more of a streamlining 
measure of UNAMID military forces to “create greater capacity to be more 
proactive to deter and meet threats on the ground”.451 This is in stark contrast 
to the case of Rwanda where the decision to reduce UNAMIR was taken by 
the Council without fully evaluating the conditions on ground and needs of the 
population (see 4.4.2). 
With regard to (c), the issue of whether to call the crisis in Darfur genocide is 
one that has now been legally settled.  Initially, the findings of the UN Interna-
tional Commission of Inquiry Into Violations of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law in Darfur determined that: 
…the Commission concludes that the Government of Sudan has not pursued 
a policy of genocide.  Arguably, two elements of genocide might be deduced 
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from the gross violations of human rights perpetrated by Government forces 
and militias under their control.  These two elements are: first, the actus reus 
consisting of killing, or causing serious bodily or mental harm, or deliberately 
inflicting conditions of life likely to bring about physical destruction; and, se-
cond, on the basis of a subjective standard, the existence of a protected group 
being target by the authors of criminal conduct.  Recent developments have 
led to the perception and self-perception of African tribes and members of Ar-
ab tribes as making up two distinct ethnic groups.  However, once crucial 
element appears to be missing, at least as far as the central Government au-
thorities are concerned: genocidal intent.  Generally speaking, the policy of 
attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes does not 
evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group distinguished 
on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds.  Rather, it would seem that 
those who planned and organised attacks on villages pursued the intent to 
drive the victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of counter-
insurgency warfare.452 
As has already been pointed out, the Commission of Inquiry reported that they 
had reason to believe that crimes against humanity and war crimes had been 
committed in Darfur and also recommended that the Council refer the Darfur 
situation to the ICC. 
 
With this referral, the ICC was better positioned to determine further whether 
the crisis in Darfur constitutes genocide.  In carrying out its duties, the ICC has 
issued arrest warrants for Sudanese individuals who are believed to bear the 
greatest criminal responsibility for crimes committed in Darfur.453  Of greatest 
significance has been the warrant of arrest for President Al Bashir, whose se-
cond warrant now also includes the charges of genocide. The pre-trial 
chamber reassessed genocide charges on the grounds that “genocide could 
be one reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the material submitted, while 
not necessarily the only reasonable conclusion.”454 In this respect, President Al 
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Bashir‟s charges included the crime of genocide because the court found that 
Al Bashir acted with specific intent to destroy in part the Fur, Masalit and 
Zaghawa ethnic groups.455 The evidence collected also uncovered the func-
tioning of the state apparatus used to commit genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.456     In effect, the prosecutor has established rea-
sonable grounds to believe that Al Bashir committed the crime of genocide un-
under the Rome Statute. 
 
With respect to whether the Darfur crisis constitutes genocide, ICC prosecutor, 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo stated that his findings indicated that the Darfur crisis 
constitutes “genocide by attrition.”457  The Institute for the Study of Genocide 
have defined genocide by attrition as follows: 
Genocide by attrition occurs after a group is singled out for political and civil 
discrimination. It is separated from the larger society, and its right to life is 
threatened through concentration and forced displacement, together with sys-
tematic deprivation of food, water, and sanitary and medical facilities. These 
measures, along with the frequent imposition of overcrowded living quarters, 
lead to death through disease and starvation.458 These actions violate Article II 
of the UN Genocide Convention, specifically: 
 causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
 deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part. 
 
Also, in the latest report of the ICC prosecutor to the Council, the prosecutor 
further confirmed that the Darfur crisis constitutes genocide and concluded 
that “the judges have established that genocide, crimes against humanity and 
                                                                                                                                                  
2012).  See also The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir. Available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf  (Date of Use: 18 September 2012). 
455 See ICC-02/05-01/09 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf  (Date of Use: 18 September 2012) 
456 Ibid. 
457 See Prosecutor’s Statement on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest under Article 58 
against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir 14 July 2008. Available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A2BA9996-67C3-4A5F-9AD2-
B20A7FD2D176/277757/ICCOTPST20080714ENG.pdf (Date of Use: 21 October 2012). 
458 See Fein “Genocide in Sudan and elsewhere” Spring 2002 
http://www.instituteforthestudyofgenocide.org/oldsite/newsletters/29/fein.html (Date of Use: 21 
October 2012). 
- 98 - 
war crimes have been committed and the President of the country and other 
high officials should face justice. It cannot be said that there is a lack of infor-
mation.”459  
 
Again, in stark contrast to the Rwandan genocide, it is clear that great efforts 
have been made to establish whether the Darfur crisis constitutes genocide or 
not. Even before it was legally termed genocide, it would appear that there 
was already consensus among the international community that the atrocities 
committed against the civilian population in Sudan need to be condemned and 
that robust intervention is required. 
 
It has also been apparent that the crises in Sudan have received greater me-
dia attention when compared to the genocide in Rwanda.  With that, comes 
the advantage of having several NGO‟s and humanitarian organizations con-
tinue to lobby for greater action in Sudan.  
 
With regard to (d), it has already been mentioned that UNAMID has never 
reached its envisioned force level of 19 555 troops. It did however reach 92.4 
per cent of the authorised strength as at March 2012. UNMISS on the other 
hand, has been successful in reaching the authorised level of 7 000 troops.460 
With UNISFA, the troop numbers look hopeful as they appear to be nearing its 
authorised strength of 4 200 military personnel; as at August 2012, UNISFA 
consisted of 3 830 troops.461  In spite of this troop contributing improvement, it 
would seem that large numbers do not necessarily mean a more effective 
peacekeeping operation.  Reports show that even though the numbers of 
troops are increasing, this has not resulted in “significant improvement in over-
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all operational and self-sustainment capabilities of military and police contin-
gents.”462 
With regard to (f), it should be noted that great lengths have been taken to ad-
dress the issues of weak mandates and effective rules of engagement.  For 
instance, the Brahimi report,463 which is now considered somewhat of a 
„peacekeeping operation bible‟, has helped transform the peacekeeping plat-
form. Its recommendations have encouraged the more frequent use of fact-
finding missions to areas of tension as a means of short term crisis preven-
tion.464  The findings of these missions have accordingly assisted mandate 
drafters with drafting mandates that are more reflective of the needs of the ci-
vilians in the tension areas. In addition to this, the panel also encourages 
robust rules of engagement.  The report states that “UN military must be capa-
ble of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission‟s 
mandate…Mandates should specify an operation‟s authority to use force”.465 
Based on the discussion of lessons learnt above, it would appear that the most 
significant challenges the UN faces with regard to the handling of conflicts are 
(a) and (d) above – member state inaction and slow deployment of troops and 
equipment. 
6.2 Recommendations 
Even though no two conflicts are the same, the Rwandan genocide and the 
crises in Sudan share a common denominator - the credibility of the UN has 
been greatly undermined.  As has already been echoed throughout this paper, 
this is not to say that the UN has achieved nothing.  It simply means that the 
UN could do more.  Through their shortcomings, the UN’s handling of the 
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Rwandan genocide also imparted lessons – lessons of which have fundamen-
tally changed the peacekeeping platform. A concept which exemplifies such 
lessons learnt is the R2P concept. This concept was created as an answer to 
member state inaction and “articulates the collective international responsibil-
ity to protect human beings whose governments refuse to do so or are actually 
the cause of murder and ethnic cleansing”.466 However, as has been demon-
strated in the case of Darfur, the emergence of this concept has not 
necessarily amounted to humanitarian intervention as the “political will to sup-
port the new idea remains problematic unless there are geopolitical as well 
humanitarian reasons to do so.”467 
The general sentiment echoed throughout this paper has been that success of 
peacekeeping heavily depends on the Council‟s ability to respond to crisis in a 
rapid and effective manner.  Experience has shown that the Council‟s actions 
or inactions have sometimes acted as saboteurs of the peace process. In this, 
we have also established that five countries ultimately hold the power on what 
action the Council takes.  The said power has been bestowed upon them by 
the UN Charter.  It is for this reason that “since UN missions can only be au-
thorised by the Security Council, and since any of the P5 can veto any 
resolution, the leverage of the US, Britain, France, Russia and China can hard-
ly be exaggerated.”468 It thus follows that there is a need – in the area of 
international law – to keep a balance between the Charter and equitable rep-
resentation in the Council. 
In this regard, the recommendations that follow attempt to increase member 
state involvement and ultimately address the challenges with troop numbers 
and efficiency. 
6.2.1 Recommendation 1: Dilute P5 powers and/or amend Council 
composition 
Chapter III briefly discussed the various ways member states have attempted 
to make changes to the Council to reflect current realities (see 3.3.1). As was 
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also mentioned, these attempts led to the subsequent establishment of an 
open-ended working group which has been tasked with “Question of equitable 
representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council”.  
This open group, along with other NGO‟s, high-level panels, civil society or-
ganisations and other interest groups have fundamentally sought to enlarge 
the composition of the Council, make it more reflective of current realities; add 
new permanent members; and/or abolish or limit the use of the veto (see 
3.3.1). 
The general consensus has been that most of the Council‟s problems would 
be solved if the powers of the P5 were diluted and/or Council composition was 
amended.  However, as has already been pointed out, such changes would 
only come into effect if the Charter were to be amended.  In this respect, it has 
also been pointed out that amendments to the Charter are next to impossible 
since the P5 themselves would have to agree to it (see Article 108 and 109 of 
the Charter).  Furthermore, it would seem that  
The Charter has been amended only three times in over half a century. The 
Security Council has been enlarged once and the Economic and Social Coun-
cil twice.  The last of these moves took place almost three decades ago.  So, 
while much of the public debate on reform continues to focus on possible 
Charter amendments, such as further expanding and diversifying the composi-
tion of the Security Council, in practice this has proved to be difficult to 
accomplish.469 
It is thus apparent that UN reform with respect to the question of equitable rep-
resentation and increase in the membership of the Security Council present 
difficult challenges that may prove insurmountable for some time to come.  
That said, it should be pointed out that the issue not only lies with the P5‟s re-
luctance to agree to such changes but also the inability of the 187 member 
states that are not permanent members to have one voice.  By and large, the-
se 187 states have demonstrated the intention to make changes in this area.  
However, due to their differences in rankings and regions, it has proven prob-
                                                                                                                                                  
468 See Caplan “From Rwanda to Darfur: Lessons Learned?” Available at 
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/31248 (Date of Use: 8 October 2012). 
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lematic for them to establish a “united front”.470 For instance, with regard to 
membership inclusion of African states as permanent members, it is not exact-
ly clear which African states would occupy the seats, though Nigeria, South 
Africa and Egypt appear to be the forerunners.471  Also, it should be noted that 
Kofi Annan presented a report in which two models were recommended for re-
form.472 Model A recommends six new permanent seats, none with veto 
powers, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among 
Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe and the Americas, whereas Model B, propos-
es no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year 
renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-
renewable) seat, divided among Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe and the 
Americas.473  The AU has strongly opposed both models as it is advocating for 
two permanent seats with veto power.474  Countries like Japan, Germany, Bra-
zil and India have expressed support for Model A “with hopes of finding 
permanent seats on the Council table”.475  As such, it would appear that the 
first step to any progress would require that that the majority of the 187 mem-
ber states establish consensus on the size and composition of the Council.  
Another recommendation that is significant to the discussion of this paper is 
the limitation of the veto. This type of limitation would ensure that permanent 
members of the Security Council consider refraining from using a veto to block 
Council action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.476  If such a limitation existed, it would help increase the 
speed at which peacekeeping operations would be deployed.  In essence, 
once the Council has determined that a population has fallen victim to war 
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crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, the Council would be in a posi-
tion to authorise the necessary action without the looming fear of the veto.  In 
this way, the P5‟s national interests or lack of would not be a determining fac-
tor of whether civilian‟s lives are saved or not.   
Therefore, if applied to the Darfur Crisis, it would seem that the Council would 
be in a better position to take more robust action against Sudan in spite of 
China and Russia‟s relationship with the Sudanese government. 
The proposal to limit the veto appears to attach more importance on improve-
ments required for overall Council effectiveness in peacekeeping operations 
and less importance on the issue of composition of permanent and non-
members of the council.  Even though this option seems less intrusive than the 
other recommendations discussed above, it would also require the amend-
ment of the Charter to reflect such a limitation.  However, in order to „override‟ 
this requirement, the P5 could sign an agreement have the UN General As-
sembly pass a resolution to that effect.  It is worthwhile to note that the 
advocates of this recommendation similarly advocate the R2P concept.477  
This recommendation to limit the use of the veto has received some form of 
acceptance by the US, France and the UN Secretariat.478  However, no actual 
measures have been taken by the Council to implement such a limitation since 
the idea conceptualised 10 years ago.479 
6.2.2 Recommendation 2: Sever China and Russia’s armament links 
to areas of tension in Africa 
Here, the aim is to attempt to find means of curbing P5 power, particularly 
when they are providing arms to tension areas.  As was mentioned in the pre-
vious Chapter, China and Russia continue to trade with Sudan.  Arguably, from 
a humanitarian standpoint, these relations cannot be encouraged.  The ques-
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tion is, are there any ways of deterring such relations? The only legal means 
appears to be the signing of an Arms Trade Treaty.  Such a treaty would en-
sure greater transparency and accountability in states dealings with the 
transfer of arms.  The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) 
is in the midst of supporting negotiations for a robust legally binding instrument 
to establish high common standards for international trade in conventional 
arms.480 However, it remains to be seen how effective such a treaty would be 
in deterring countries like China and Russia from supplying arms to wars in Af-
rica. 
6.2.3 Recommendation 3: Creation of a stand-by permanent army  
The idea of a stand-by permanent army is one that attempts to address the 
issue of not having ill-equipped and poorly trained troops.  The Brahimi report 
stressed the gravity of deploying troops within the first thirty to ninety days of a 
crisis.481  The various crises have demonstrated that more often than not, this 
has not been possible for the UN.  In attempt to overcome this obstacle, the 
Brahimi report recommends the creation of a standby and rapid reaction ar-
my.482  Such an army would ideally be a permanent military volunteer force, 
which would entail that recruitment is done directly from the public and not 
through agreements with the government. The exclusion of government in-
volvement stems from the rationale that “the motivation for taking the 
necessary risks for defence of human rights is more likely to reside in particu-
lar individuals than in governments.”483  
Essentially, such a volunteer force would handle their recruitment similarly to 
that of the United Nations Volunteers (UNV). Such a force would also be 
trained and equipped by the UN which would entail that the training is equal 
and according to UN standards.  However, critics of this proposal have pointed 
out that such an army would tarnish the image of the UN as „peacekeeper‟ and 
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replace it with a purely military image.484   In addition to this, critics contend 
that the establishment of such a force would place undue financial burden on 
member states – the force “would have to be financed outside the regular UN 
budget, so as to avoid it becoming hostage to the generosity of individual 
states”.485 It would prove difficult to make the force financially independent 
from member state contributions and if not independent, the force would have 
the same problems that current ad hoc military deployments have – contribu-
tions are only made if involvement in a tension area would further the troop 
contributing countries purpose.486 Also, it would seem that establishing such a 
force would bring the Council back in its original position since “the arbitrary 
character and relative legitimacy of decisions regarding intervention would re-
main, because these are fundamentally inherent in the UN‟s existence, and 
decisions related to the use of force will always be decided by states.”487 
On balance, it would seem that the objections to such an army are valid.  Un-
less, solutions are found to counter the financial dependency that such an 
army would have on member states, particularly the P5, it is highly unlikely 
that such a force will be established in the near future. 
6.2.4 Recommendation 4: Creation of a European Union-like body 
Under this scenario, the objective would be to form a European Union (EU)-
like body that would be empowered to implement and advance the concept of 
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).  The EU would be used as a model due to 
its unique nature and ability to bind states to comply with its laws and policies.  
In this regard, this new body would mirror the following characteristics of the 
EU: 
a. The EU is a body based on the rule of law created through a treaty, volun-
tarily and democratically agreed by all of its member countries.488In this 
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respect, the new EU-like body would be founded through a negotiated trea-
ty with the purpose of furthering the interests of the R2P concept.  
b. With the EU, member states group their sovereignty; surrendering the right 
to make independent decisions in certain areas.489 In this regard, the new 
EU-like body would require member states to surrender their sovereignty 
only with respect to making decisions related to civilians affected by crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and genocide.  
c. The EU has the power to force members to comply.  Like the EU, this EU-
like body would derive this power from the treaty that member states would 
sign upon joining this body. 
d. The EU is founded on the principle of speaking with one voice.490 The EU-
like body would thus aim to speak with one voice only with regards to im-
plementing and advancing the R2P concept.  Member states would thus be 
bound on the issue of the R2P.  Member states of this new body would be 
called upon to implement this body‟s laws and policies based on the con-
cept of R2P. 
e. The EU governs a union of European states.491 The EU-like body would 
fundamentally govern all UN member states in relation to the R2P concept. 
The above characteristics are unlike the UN and the establishment of such a 
body could serve as an alternative to the long debated issues surrounding UN 
Council reform.  The voting system of this new body would aim to be fair and 
equitable and represent current realities; no member state would have the 
power of the veto. Each member state would appoint an international humani-
tarian law/human rights expert to represent them.  The issues on the agenda 
of this body would be by referral only. The UN Security Council would refer 
matters vis-à-vis civilians affected by crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
genocide.   
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In this regard, should there be a crisis such as the one in Darfur and a greater 
part of the Council‟s non-member states believe that more could be done and 
inaction is due to a veto or threat of veto, the member states (permanent or 
non-permanent) of the Council could refer a matter to this body for further de-
liberation. Once a situation has been referred to this body, the member states 
representatives would deliberate on the issue and prepare draft direc-
tives/resolutions corresponding to the needs of civilians most concerned and 
vote on the way forward.  Once a majority of member states (at least two 
thirds) approve a decision, the matter will be sent back to the Council and its 
member states would be forced to comply with its decision.  Therefore, if the 
new body has decided that military intervention is the best course of action by 
the Council, then the Council would be required to implement this. 
The operation of this treaty-based body would be governed by treaties signed 
by the states.  Alternatively, the body could draft a constitution that would gov-
ern the issues surrounding each member states commitment and duty to the 
R2P concept.  Such a constitution would encourage cooperation across the 
spectrum of the R2P concept thereby enhancing international peace and secu-
rity. 
Establishment of such a scenario would also help improve the legal framework 
for R2P issues in local legislation.  Once states have the signed the treaty and 
joined the body, they would also be required to adopt all common rules, stand-
ards and policies relating to R2P.  Therefore, the body‟s common rules, 
standards and policies would have priority over national directives such as the 
US PDD25.   
A crucial factor to the success of such a body is the heavy participation of 
states. Great participation of states - ideally from each region - would enhance 
the understanding of complex issues specific to a region.  In the context of Af-
rican conflicts, African states would probably be more eager to join this body 
as it would provide them with a platform to directly influence the outcome of 
conflicts in their region, which is currently not the case with the UN Security 
Council.  Another crucial factor to the success of this new body would be the 
establishment of effective enforcement mechanisms.  These mechanisms con-
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tained in signed treaties or directives would have to be strong enough to force 
member states to comply, particularly the P5.  
By and large, the recommendation to establish such a body appears to be 
more feasible since it would not require that the P5 relinquish their veto right 
nor make any changes to the composition of the Council.  Also, as already 
mentioned, many states particularly African states, have always felt marginal-
ised for not having a permanent seat on the Council.  This body would help 
address that problem and help Africans have a stronger voice on the interna-
tional stage. 
However, issues surrounding the financing of such a body may prove cumber-
some. This begs the question: If all UN member states were called on to 
become members of this body, how would the contributions be divided? If the 
member state contributions are to reflect the current UN model, then richer 
states would have more control of the body, thus mimicking the issue of having 
super powers control decisions related to peacekeeping. To avoid this, the 
body could be made up of the richest and most populated (three to four states) 
of each region.  Therefore, the composition of this Council would roughly re-
flect the following: 
Americas – US, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico 
Asia – China, Japan, Singapore, India 
Africa – South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria 
Europe – France, Germany, UK, Russia 
Middle East – Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 
Australia and Pacific Islands – Australia and New Zealand 
The above composition would ensure that each region is represented fairly 
and the states involved would have the financial means to ensure the continu-
ous and effective operation of the body. 
That said, in spite of the advancement that such a body would potentially bring 
in the area of R2P, it is likely that most states, particularly the P5, would be re-
luctant to surrender their right to make independent decisions related to the 
R2P concept. Furthermore, even though it is envisioned that this body would 
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have the power to change and direct the course of action to be taken on mat-
ters related to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, such power 
may not automatically entail an increase in financial contributions towards 
peacekeeping missions nor would it imply an increase in troop contribution 
from member states of the UN. 
However, with proper planning coupled with carefully crafted „marketing‟ of the 
body‟s potential, the possibility of establishment is seemingly plausible. 
6.3 Conclusion 
In many respects, the UN has taken great strides to greatly expand and im-
prove itself in the general domain of peacekeeping.  However, for the UN to be 
completely effective there is a pressing need for changes to be made with re-
spect to the use of the veto in peacekeeping.  If the P5 are allowed to continue 
to have „sole discretion‟ to dictate if and when lives are saved - depending on 
what interests are at play - the Council will continue to flounder in the area of 
peacekeeping. 
That said, it is imperative to point out that conflict will always occur. The ideal 
world is not one where the Council has no conflicts on its agenda but one 
where the worst is prevented.  It must also be stressed that the ultimate re-
sponsibility for maintaining peace and security lie with the states themselves.  
As Sir David Hannay, representative of the United Kingdom succinctly put it:  
“the UN cannot impose peace where there is no willingness to sustain com-
promise”.492  
With Africa, experience has also shown that the conflicts in this region are 
complex and require immense understanding of the dynamics at play.  Taking 
the stance of “Africans for African problems” will not further the purpose of 
peace and security in the region, as the work of AMIS demonstrated.  Yes, Af-
ricans sometimes do understand African problems better but it is clear that UN 
involvement is critical to peacekeeping. Moreover, we live in a world where our 
ties with the rest of world are intricately intertwined and the idea of finding so-
lutions by creating divides that separate „us‟ from „them‟ is one that has never 
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proved useful. Rather, collaborations with regional organisations such as the 
AU should be further encouraged.  Since the AU is a fairly new organisation, 
the increase in experience that the AU will acquire in the next decade will be 
crucial to support the UN with a strong local partner. 
There is no organisation that has been able to address the world‟s problems 
like the UN has. Brian Urquhart described this notion by stating that “there is 
always a challenge ahead, an historic opportunity to be grasped.. The UN has 
taken the lead in many of the great historic issues of our time, and its record is 
far more impressive than is generally appreciated.”493 
With all its flaws, we have seen the UN advance the interests of humankind, 
particularly in the areas of human rights law and international law even when 
the rest of the world experienced „peacekeeping fatigue‟.  However, this body 
will never reach its fullest potential unless great strides are made to increase 
the political will of member states be it through limitation of the veto and/or 
amendment of the composition of the Council.  
The issues and challenges are thus clear. The means of overcoming them are 
plentiful albeit complex. The international community, particularly the P5, need 
to reach some form of compromise to advance the needs and wants of the 
greater good. 
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